“Dual Track Advocacy:” Legal Strategies, Political Strategies and Their Intersection in the Marriage Equality Movement by Jones, Alexander Wade
University of Vermont
ScholarWorks @ UVM
UVM Honors College Senior Theses Undergraduate Theses
2014
“Dual Track Advocacy:” Legal Strategies, Political
Strategies and Their Intersection in the Marriage
Equality Movement
Alexander Wade Jones
ajones17@uvm.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uvm.edu/hcoltheses
This Honors College Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for
inclusion in UVM Honors College Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UVM. For more information, please contact
donna.omalley@uvm.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jones, Alexander Wade, "“Dual Track Advocacy:” Legal Strategies, Political Strategies and Their Intersection in the Marriage Equality
Movement" (2014). UVM Honors College Senior Theses. Paper 14.
“Dual Track Advocacy:” Legal Strategies, Political Strategies and Their Intersection in the 
Marriage Equality Movement 
 
A thesis offered to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of a 
Bachelors of Arts with an Honors Endorsement 
By Alexander Wade Jones 
May 13, 2014 
  2 
Table of Contents 
I.  Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….4 
II.  Definitions of Key Terms…..………………………………………………………………….6 
 A.  Legal…………………………………………………………………………………...6 
 B.  Political………………………………………………………………………………...7 
 C.  LGB……………………………………………………………………………………8 
III.  Methods……………………………………………………………………………………...11 
IV.  Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………...12 
 A.  Politics and Law in the Marriage Equality Movement………………………………12 
 B.  Backlash……………………………………………………………………………...13 
 C.  Legal Strategy………………………………………………………………………..20 
 D.  Political Strategy……………………………………………………………………..22 
V.  A Short History of Marriage Equality Litigation…………………………………………….24 
 A.  Overview……………………………………………………………………………..24 
 B.  The First Cases (1970-1985)…..……………………………………………………..24 
 C.  Victory and Defeat in the Shadow of Bowers (1986-2002)………………………….27 
 D.  The Advent of Marriage Equality: the Lawrence and Goodridge Era (2003-2007)…35 
 E.  Victory in Connecticut and Iowa, but Reversal in California (2008-2009)……….....42 
F.  The Attack on DOMA, Section 3, and the Advent of Marriage Equality in California 
(2010-June 2013)………………………………………………………………………...45 
G.  The Windsor and Perry Era: (July 2013-December 2013)…………………………..50 
VI.  Results and Analysis………………………………………………………………………...54 
 A.  The Unity of Politics and the Law...............................................................................54 
  3 
 B.  Potential Tensions Between Politics and the Law…………………………………...61 
 C.  The Involvement and Issues of National Organizations……………………………..64 
 D.  Windsor as the Result of a Political-Legal Strategy…………………………………70 
 E.  Plaintiff Selection…………………………………………………………………….72 
 F.  Marshalling Amici Curiae…………………………………………………………….79 
 G.  Backlash……………………………………………………………………………...84 
H.  Backlash Due to Prematurity: Was Marriage Foisted on the LGB Rights 
Movement?........................................................................................................................91 
I.  The End of Backlash?....................................................................................................97 
J.  The Effect of Losses in Litigation and the Legislature……………………………...100 
K.  The Viability of Civil Unions………………………………………………………104 
L.  Legal Strategy……………………………………………………………………….105 
VII.  Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...112 
VIII.  Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………...115 
  4 
I.  Introduction 
 The LGB rights movement is one of the great civil rights movements of our time.  
Whereas the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the struggle to extend full recognition of African-
Americans’ citizenship and dignity, the past two decades have witnessed a similar struggle as the 
nation has moved to accept LGB people1 and recognize their full citizenship.  In the LGB rights 
movement, perhaps the most visible issue for the last twenty years has been marriage equality.  
The first cases suing for the right to marriage for LGB people were filed in the 1970s, but the 
issue of marriage for same-sex couples only emerged into public view in the 1990s.  Following 
numerous losses in the first decades of marriage equality litigation, organizations litigating for 
marriage equality and private advocates for marriage equality finally began winning cases in 
courts across the nation. 
This thesis draws on interviews with many of the main attorneys involved in the 
organizations campaigning for marriage equality over the past two decades, many of whom run 
such organizations.  Using the information from those interviews, this thesis analyzes how the 
organizations campaigning for marriage equality managed to win in court and protect those 
victories from interference from other branches of government.  To do so, this thesis focuses on 
the intersection of law and politics in marriage equality litigation, the understanding of 
organizations working toward marriage equality of that intersection, and the strategies of those 
organizations that stem from an understanding of that intersection.  This thesis analyzes both 
legal and political strategies, as well as investigating the actual workings of the organizations 
campaigning for marriage equality.  In so doing, this thesis also addresses those organizations’ 
conception and reaction to the “backlash hypothesis” that dominates scholarly literature of the 
marriage equality movement. 
                                                      
1 See definitions below. 
  5 
 This thesis begins with definitions of key terms to avoid confusion, followed by a 
discussion of the methods used in this study, followed by a review of the extant literature.  Since 
the law looks backward even as it advances, and since the lawyers interviewed for this study 
referred to past cases and based their strategy on the cases’ outcomes, a short history of marriage 
equality litigation follows the literature review.  After that short history, the results of the 
interviews are presented.  I conclude that the organizations campaigning for marriage equality 
have internalized the backlash hypothesis, and thus emphasize the political aspect of marriage 
equality test cases.  I also conclude that such organizations have politicized almost every aspect 
of their work to both win and protect legal victories, turning such traditionally legal aspects of 
litigation such as plaintiff selection, amici briefs and even legal arguments into political tools. 
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II.  Definitions of Key Terms 
Many current scholars do not separate the concepts of “legal” and “political,” and instead 
view them as two parts of the same whole.  This is reflected in modern theories of attitudinalism, 
which argues that legal decisions made by judges are actually political decisions.  On the other 
hand, the theories of historical institutionalism argue that judges make decisions based both on 
policy preferences and the limits imposed by law and custom.2  Some scholars have even argued 
that “Constitutional arguments are as much the stuff of politics as the pork barrel and the log 
roll.…[B]asic constitutional institutions provide normative and procedural frameworks that allow 
political debate.”3  This essay will deal with “legal” and “political” aspects of marriage equality 
cases as separate entities, even though this essay will also discuss how every marriage equality 
case has both legal and political aspects that must be attended to in order for advocates of 
marriage equality to succeed. 
In all the interviews conducted for this essay, the participants acknowledged that the 
prevailing wisdom in the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation is that there are, 
in fact, these two sides of every marriage case.  According to most, this was a hard lesson 
learned after the first marriage cases.  In order to analyze political and legal aspects of marriage 
equality cases, this essay separates them with the understanding that such a separation is merely 
a device used for analysis, and not a division that is reflected at all times in campaigns for 
marriage equality.  The following definitions are definitions of key terms used in this essay, and 
will govern the discussion of legal and political aspects of marriage equality cases. 
A.  Legal 
                                                      
2 Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber & Keith E. Whittington, American Constitutionalism, Volume I: Structures of 
Government, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 17. 
3 Ibid., xx. 
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 For the purposes of this essay, the term “legal” shall refer to any actions that take place in 
the judicial branch of government, and not in the elected branches of government or in relation to 
popular referenda.  As such, legal strategies are strategies that pertain only to arguments used in 
courts of law.  The legal aspects of the marriage cases discussed in this essay are the aspects of 
the cases that occurred in courts of law, and not in legislatures or in the general public.  Legal 
arguments and strategies include arguing for heightened versus rational basis scrutiny of a law or 
using Due Process arguments instead of Equal Protection arguments.  There are aspects of the 
cases discussed in this case that do not neatly fit into definitions of “political” and “legal” 
without making definitions of those terms so wide as to rob them of meaning.  Such aspects 
include the timing of bringing a lawsuit and amici curiae briefs.  The timing of a lawsuit may be 
influenced by events outside the judicial branch in the public or in legislatures.  However, since 
the action of bringing of a case and its adjudication both occur in courts of law, such decisions 
will be discussed as legal strategies.  Similarly, as I will show, the marshalling of amici curiae 
has overwhelmingly political overtones.  Sometimes briefs filed by amici do not even make 
legalistic arguments.  However, since the briefs are filed with courts of law and are filed as 
means to the end of influencing a lawsuit, amici briefs shall be discussed in terms of legal 
strategy as much as possible. 
B.  Political 
 As mentioned above, legal actions occur in the judiciary.  Political actions are actions that 
occur in the elected branches of government and the general public, either in the context of a 
popular referendum or not.  Political aspects of the cases discussed in this essay include 
grassroots organizing of volunteers to run the organizations that bring lawsuits, public advocacy, 
lobbying in legislatures, and public education.  Although actions taken in the elected branches 
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have legal overtones because they deal with the creation of law and policy, such actions shall be 
discussed as political strategies, since they occur solely in the elected branches.  This essay is not 
so much focused on the language of the laws enacted by referendum or legislative processes, but 
on the process that led to that final product of a law.  Another difficulty in this definition is the 
use of amicus curiae briefs, a type of legal form, to make political points.  As I will show, the 
organizations litigating for marriage equality do this quite often.  Amici briefs that are written to 
rebut popular conceptions of LGB people, or to show that large swaths of society already support 
marriage equality engage in political arguments.  Amici briefs that make such arguments do not 
argue along legal lines, such as advocating for a specific level of judicial scrutiny.  Instead, such 
briefs aim to show or build consensus.  Thus, for the purposes of this essay, the term “political” 
will also refer to attempts to reach consensus and to appeal to non-legal arguments. 
C.  LGB 
 In this essay, the acronym LGB is used to represent all people who self-identify as 
lesbian, gay or bisexual, and are therefore likely to be either involved in or affected by the 
lawsuits discussed in this essay.  Although far more common acronyms are LGBTQ (Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual, and Queer/Questioning) or just LGBT, I have decided 
to use simply LGB.  I made this decision with no intention of lessening other identities in 
importance.  Issues facing transgender and transgender persons are of immense importance, and 
represent a still-developing and fascinating field of law and policy.4  However, such issues are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  This paper deals only with marriage, and transsexual/transgender 
marriage is an issue too much in flux and too recently arrived at by the public conscious to be 
                                                      
4 See Anton Marino, “TRANSgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections Against Wrongful 
Employment Termination on the Basis of the Transgender Identity,” Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 21, 
no. 4 (2013): 865-893; Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, “Transgenderless,” Harvard Journal of Law & 
Gender 35, (2012): 399-423; and Chinyere Ezie, “Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and 
Sex Discrimination - The Need for Strict Scrutiny,” Columbia Journal of Gender & Law 20 (2011): 141. 
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addressed in adequate depth in this study.  As such, this essay shall use LGB as its acronym.5  
This essay shall also use the term “marriage equality” except when interviewees mention 
marriage equality by other terms.  “Marriage equality” is now the preferred term for discussing 
the goal of the movement, as opposed to “same-sex marriage” or “gay marriage.”  The transition 
from those two phrases to “marriage equality” was a slow process.  As I will show, some 
attorneys campaigning for marriage equality in the 1990s opposed the use of “same-sex” or “gay 
marriage” as descriptors of their goals.  To those attorneys, such terms were too narrow—they 
saw themselves as fighting for marriage for everyone, regardless of sexual orientation, gender 
identification, or any other characteristic.  However, the terms “same-sex marriage” and “gay 
marriage” were easier for the public to use, and so were used at first.  Now, with the nation more 
familiar and comfortable with marriage equality, and with the fine-tuning of the political 
outreach of organizations working toward marriage equality, the term “marriage equality” has 
gained popularity. 
 Throughout this essay I refer to the LGB community and the LGB rights movement, 
more colloquially referred to as the gay rights movement.  The LGB community exists more in 
theory than in reality, and, as Aloni explains in words that apply as much to his as this essay, 
This does not mean that a monolithic community of LGB individuals exists in any meaningful way.  At 
times, the multitude of interests within this community converge; at other times, they diverge 
significantly.  Acknowledging this to be the case, I nevertheless refer to a “community” throughout 
this Article, and I attempt to be clear about those times when interests within the community are most 
likely to diverge, especially vis-à-vis marriage.6 
                                                      
5 The use of LGB is not unusual, and Erez Aloni gave a wonderful explanation for its use, which also works in this 
context: 
“I use the term LGB to describe members who self-identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual.  In doing so, I do not intend 
to erase or obscure other identities.…This article does not refer specifically to transgender marriage because this 
raises questions concerning a state’s definition of male and female.  For some transgender individuals, the option to 
marry already exists, even in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage.  This is not to say that transgender 
people do not have an interest in same-sex marriage, just that the rules for determining the sex of a person are 
different from state to state and involve different sets of legal rules.” (Erez Aloni, “Incrementalism, Civil Unions, 
and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage,” Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 
18: 106n1). 
6 Ibid. 
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The same may be said of the LGB rights movement, and even the much more recently arisen 
marriage equality movement.  The LGB rights movement has focused on as many goals as there 
have been interests within the LGB community.  These issues have changed over time, and 
strategies have also changed.  There are also many organizations working toward LGB rights, 
each with their own mission and strategy.  To talk of the LGB rights movement as monolithic 
may be misleading, and the times when voices within the movement differed with each other 
shall be duly noted.  The movement toward marriage equality also contains many voices, groups 
and strategies.  Just as there is no monolithic LGB community or LGB rights community, there is 
no monolithic marriage equality movement.  In fact, until the late 1990s, the marriage equality 
movement did not truly exist as a movement.  Until that point, most work toward marriage 
equality was done by organizations that were involved in the LGB rights movement and private 
attorneys.  By 2014 there are many organizations, such as Freedom to Marry, dedicated to 
marriage equality, so one can properly talk of a “movement” for marriage equality.  Of course, 
that movement works toward a single goal – marriage equality – but it does not move as a single 
unit on every case, law and situation.  The main organizations that have worked toward marriage 
equality (Lambda Legal, the ACLU’s Gay, Lesbian, Transgender & AIDS Project, Freedom to 
Marry, Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, the Human Rights Campaign and the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights) provide much of the guidance, funding, and litigation for the broader 
campaign, but other parties, such as private attorneys and individuals are also important actors.  I 
shall be clear when organizations undertook certain strategies and campaigns, as opposed to 
private individuals.  I shall also be clear when organizations working for LGB rights and 
marriage equality had internal differences of note, and when they did not. 
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III.  Methods 
 The principle sources for this thesis are structured qualitative interviews of six named 
attorneys and one unnamed attorney involved with marriage equality litigation, along with 
secondary sources, such as legal briefs, academic works, law review articles, and court decisions.  
To best understand the meshing of legal and political strategies, the interviews focused on those 
topics and their intersection.  The interviews stressed both the interpretive “how” and 
experiential “what” questions.7  The author conducted all interviews, and all recordings and 
transcriptions of the interviews are held on file with the author. 
The interviewed attorneys that wished to be named in this study were Susan Murray (one 
of the lead attorneys in Baker v. State of Vermont), Beth Robinson (another lead attorney in 
Baker and now Associate Justice on the Vermont Supreme Court), Mary Bonauto (Civil Rights 
Project Director at Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders), Evan Wolfson (longtime attorney 
at Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and founder of Freedom to Marry), Kevin 
Cathcart (Executive Director of Lambda Legal) and James Esseks (Director of the ACLU’s 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & AIDS Project).  I also interviewed one attorney who did 
not want to be named in this thesis.  Where that person’s comments appear, this thesis will 
merely note the date of the interview, offering no other identifying facts. 
                                                      
7 James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, “Active Interviewing,” in Darin Weinberg, ed., Qualitative Research 
Methods, (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 124. 
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IV.  Literature Review 
A.  Politics and Law in the Marriage Equality Movement 
 This thesis addresses the broad question of the interaction and place of law and politics in 
reform movements.  There is agreement among scholars that the two are inextricably linked in 
the campaign for marriage equality, even though both organizations and private attorneys have 
focused on litigation.  Thomas Keck has argued that law and politics are linked, and that insisting 
otherwise ignores “the causal significance of the litigation campaigns.”8  Stephen Engel found9 
an empirical basis for the link between public opinion and gay rights litigation.  Engels 
discovered that, no matter what the outcome of a case, public opposition to gay rights increased 
after court rulings.10  Scott Cummings and Douglass NeJaimie argued11 that politics and public 
opinion could not be separated in a study of the marriage equality litigation in California.  Thus, 
they included not only litigation but also the political maneuvering and public advocacy that 
accompanied it in their sweeping account of the Californian marriage equality litigation 
campaign.12  Dale Carpenter has also argued that the lawyers involved in the landmark decision 
of Lawrence v. Texas had to carefully control access to the plaintiffs, and continue to do so 
today.13  Carpenter argued that the lawyers did this to control the political messages surrounding 
the case, as the plaintiffs themselves were not the most exemplary individuals.14 
 Daniel Pinello has also demonstrated15 the intense political activity that accompanied the 
                                                      
8 Thomas Keck, “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights,” Law & Society 
Review 43, no. 1 (2009): 151-186. 
9 In “Frame Spillover: Media Framing and Public Opinion of a Multifaceted LGBT Rights Agenda,” Law & Social 
Inquiry 38, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 403-441. 
10 Ibid., 405. 
11 In “Lawyering for Marriage Equality,” UCLA Law Review 57 (2010): 1235-1331. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Dale Carpenter, Flagrant Conduct: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas: How a Bedroom Arrest Decriminalized Gay 
Americans, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012), 70-74. 
14 Ibid., 91. 
15 In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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marriage equality litigation in Massachusetts in 2004.  Beth Robinson, one of the lead attorneys 
in Baker v. State of Vermont, has also shown16 the intense lobbying and political maneuvering 
that accompanied the litigation in Baker after the Vermont Supreme Court ordered the legislature 
to find a solution to the problem of the denial of marriage to same-sex couples.  Mary Bonauto, a 
lead attorney in Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), has also argued17 that the 
political progress the LGB rights movement had made in Massachusetts, such as with 
employment non-discrimination law, made the victory in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health possible. 
 Despite the consensus that law and politics are connected in the marriage equality 
litigation campaign, there is little research on whether key actors, such as directors of 
organizations and the lawyers at such organizations, agree that there is a connection between the 
two.  Since there has been no research done on what attorneys involved in this litigation think on 
this subject, there has been no research on how such thinking affects strategies in the 
organizations litigating for marriage equality.  There is also no research on how those 
organizations handle activity that blurs the already oft-elusive line between law and politics, such 
as amicus briefs.  Finally, there is no research on what the state of the interaction between law 
and politics is in the campaign for marriage equality now.  There is no research on the effect 
recent swings in public opinion and victories for the cause of marriage equality have had on the 
strategies of the organizations that have worked toward that goal.  This thesis will address and 
seek to fill each of those gaps in the literature. 
B.  Backlash 
 Backlash, one of the visible manifestations of the interaction of law and politics, is more 
                                                      
16 In “The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont,” Seton Hall Constitutional Journal 11 
(Spring, 2001): 237-257. 
17 In “Goodridge in Context,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 40 (2005): 10-21. 
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often discussed because of its practical implications.  Anyone approaching the subjects of issue 
litigation, reform movements, and the marriage equality litigation campaign specifically must 
confront the issue of the backlash hypothesis, which features prominently in the literature on 
such subjects.  Vesla M. Weaver, in an article about elite whites’ reactions to civil rights 
advances by black Americans in the 1960s, defines the term in the following manner: “Backlash 
is the politically and electorally expressed public resentment that arises from perceived racial 
advance, intervention, or excess.”18  Backlash in the context of the LGB rights movement and the 
marriage equality litigation may be defined in the exact same manner, substituting the LGB 
population into the definition instead of racial groups. 
Perhaps the two most vocal proponents of the backlash hypothesis are Gerald N. 
Rosenberg and Michael J. Klarman.  Rosenberg’s famous book The Hollow Hope, when 
originally published in 1991, focused on the backlash from various types of issue litigation, 
especially that surrounding the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.  According to 
Rosenberg, the litigation that led to Brown v. Board of Education was practically meaningless.  
In Rosenberg’s analysis, only after the U.S. Congress and executive agencies in the federal 
government set about enforcing Brown in the mid 1960s did the Supreme Court’s decision carry 
any meaning.  The second edition of The Hollow Hope extended that hypothesis to marriage 
equality litigation in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts from 1993 to 2004.19  According to 
Rosenberg, the victories for marriage equality in Hawaii (Baehr v. Lewin), Vermont (Baker v. 
State of Vermont), and Massachusetts (Goodridge v. Department of Public Health) all came at a 
terrible cost.  The victory in Hawaii was immediately erased by popular referendum and 
                                                      
18 Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American 
Political Development 21 (Fall 2007): 237. 
19 The Hollow Hope: Can Court Bring About Social Change? 2nd edition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2008). 
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subsequent legislative action.  The partial victory in Vermont was achieved only to have the 
Democrats (most of whom had supported the civil union bill of 2000) lose control of the 
Vermont House of Representatives in the 2000 elections.  Furthermore, by 2006, forty-five states 
and the federal government had adopted measures to define marriage as the union of one man 
and one woman.20  This trend only got worse after Goodridge, for in 2004, eleven states ratified 
amendments to their constitutions defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman.21  
Rosenberg even goes so far as to say that the placement of marriage amendments on the ballot in 
2004 may have cost Democrats key elections that year, including the presidential election.22 
Similarly, Klarman has argued23 that the litigation surrounding Brown v. Board of 
Education did more harm than good.  The Supreme Court’s ruling against school segregation 
based on race sparked massive southern resistance and undermined the efforts of white 
moderates by polarizing the politics of race.  Perhaps the most ostentatious example of the 
resistance Brown sparked was the “Southern Manifesto” in which southern Senators and 
Representatives pledged to overturn the Brown decision “by any lawful means.”24  In a more 
recent article,25 Klarman extended his backlash hypothesis to the marriage equality litigation in 
Massachusetts in 2003.  According to Klarman, the “most significant short-term consequences of 
Goodridge, as with Brown, may have been the political backlash that it inspired.”26 
The backlash hypothesis has a neat logic.  According to the backlash hypothesizers, 
advances on marriage equality that came before public support was present for such a move met 
                                                      
20 Ibid., 363-364. 
21 Ibid., 364. 
22 Ibid., 375. 
23 In “Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement,” Virginia Law Review 80 (1994): 7-150. 
24 This may be found at Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 102, part 4 (March 12, 1956): 4459-
4460. 
25 “Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge),” Michigan Law Review 104 (2005): 431-489. 
26 Ibid, 482.  However, as will be discussed below, Klarman has recently changed his thinking on the backlash 
hypothesis as applied to the marriage equality movement. 
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with electorally expressed resentment and possible reversal.  Other scholars who support the 
backlash hypothesis include political scientist Mark Carl Rom,27 historian John D’Emilio28 and 
political scientists Karen O’Connor and Alixandra B. Yanus.29  Each bases their analysis of the 
campaign for marriage equality on the backlash hypothesis and offer techniques to avoid 
backlash.  The four scholars recommend a much more political strategy for the organizations 
campaigning for marriage equality, instead of a litigation-heavy strategy. 
On the other hand, there are many scholars who do not accept the backlash hypothesis’s 
narrative of litigation inevitably meeting with either immediate meaninglessness or electoral 
reversal.  Ellen Ann Andersen has argued that “there are at least some circumstances in which 
reformers can be served by turning to courts,” and uses the very cases that Rosenberg cites as 
evidence that courts can bring about “favorable shifts in the legal and cultural frames 
surrounding gay rights.”30  Carlos A. Ball, who also examines Brown and other cases the 
backlash hypothesizers focus on, agrees with Andersen, and argues31 that backlash is a natural 
part of controversial litigation, but that the campaign for marriage equality has made real gains 
despite resistance.  Patricia A. Cain agrees, arguing32 that backlash happens in all civil rights 
movements, but that the real measure of a movement’s strength is the steps forward it takes 
against the headwind of backlash.  Similarly, William N. Eskridge, Jr. argues33 that, while Baehr 
produced debilitating reversals for LGB people, it did prepare the ground for Baker in Vermont.  
                                                      
27 In “Introduction: The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage,” in The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, edited by Craig A. 
Rimmerman & Clyde Wilcox, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1-38. 
28 In “Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage,” in The Politics of Same-
Sex Marriage, 39-64. 
29 In “’Til Death—or the Supreme Court—Do Us Part: Litigating Gay Marriage,” in The Politics of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 291-312. 
30 Ellen Ann Andersen, Out of the Closets & into the Courts: Legal Opportunity Structures and Gay Rights 
Litigation, (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2006), 216. 
31 In “The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its 
Aftermath,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 14 (2006): 1493-1538. 
32 In “Contextualizing Varnum v. Brien: A ‘Moment’ in History,” Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 13 (2009): 27-
58. 
33 In Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights, (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
  17 
More recently, Eskridge has argued34 that most backlash hypothesis scholarship confuses 
backlash with normal politics, and argues that litigation has significantly advanced the cause of 
marriage equality.  In the same vein, Daniel Pinello has argued,35 based on numerous interviews 
with main actors in the marriage equality movement, that the Goodridge decision accomplished 
real good for LGB people, and that it inspired elites and grass roots to mobilize across the nation. 
Taking an international perspective, Miriam Smith has argued36 that the more successful 
Canadian marriage equality movement has relied on litigation just as much as the American 
movement, leading her to suggest that litigation does not always lead to backlash in marriage 
equality cases.  Keck has also argues37 that, empirically, backlash has not been nearly as serious 
or prevalent as Rosenberg and Klarman make it out to be, especially in the cases of 
Massachusetts and Vermont.  In their sweeping survey of California marriage equality 
litigation,38 Scott L. Cummings and Douglas NeJaime conclude that the backlash hypothesis 
overstates its claim.  Specifically, evidence from California’s extensive marriage equality 
litigation, which eventually led to In Re Marriage Cases and Proposition 8, does not support the 
claim “that the court decision caused the bad outcome.”39  Furthermore, Cummings and 
NeJaimie point to evidence from California and Maine’s efforts to legislate marriage equality as 
proof that the backlash hypothesizers forget that legislative action can lead to the same negative 
political ramifications as litigation.40  Perhaps the most impressive argument against a rigid and 
robust backlash hypothesis is Michael Klarman’s more recent work.  Since the publication of the 
                                                      
34 In “Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States,” 
Boston University Law Review 93 (2013): 275-323. 
35 In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage. 
36 In Political Institutions and Lesbian and Gay Rights in the United States and Canada, (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
37 In “Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decision on LGBT Rights.” 
38 “Lawyering for Marriage Equality.” 
39 Ibid., 1323. 
40 Ibid., 1324 & 1325. 
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articles mentioned previously, Klarman has argued41 that backlash only comes when losers in 
court cases are committed, organized and geographically concentrated.  Klarman even concludes 
that, although the road to success has been fraught with peril for LGB people and their allies, 
marriage equality litigation has been successful and beneficial. 
Part of Klarman’s about-face perhaps came from the rapid progress the marriage equality 
movement made in 2013, which cast serious doubt on the applicability of the backlash 
hypothesis to the marriage equality litigation campaign.  The backlash hypothesis emerged in the 
2000s.  Klarman’s article supporting the backlash hypothesis with an analysis of Goodridge’s 
aftermath was published in 2005.  The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage, to which Rom, D’Emilio, 
O’Connor and Yanus all contributed pieces of scholarship, is a veritable jeremiad lamenting the 
reality of the backlash hypothesis.  That collection of pro-backlash hypothesis scholarship was 
published in 2007.  The next year, in 2008, Rosenberg published the second edition of The 
Hollow Hope, arguing strongly in favor of the backlash hypothesis in relation to the marriage 
equality litigation campaign.  In that year, the backlash hypothesis, at least superficially, 
appeared quite valid.  By 2008, the movement had only managed to achieve real marriage 
equality in Massachusetts and had never won a political battle over marriage, such as a 
referendum.  However, in 2009, Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia all 
brought about marriage equality through political channels.42  Since then, the marriage equality 
movement has won many political and legal victories and has seen the percentage of Americans 
in support of marriage equality rise to over fifty.  Given the current climate surrounding marriage 
equality, the arguments in favor of backlash are less empirically intuitive. 
                                                      
41 In From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash and the Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
42 15 V.S.A. § 8 (amended 2009); 43 R.S.A. § 457 (amended 2009); and The Associated Press “Washington, D.C., 
Recognizes Same-Sex Marriages,” The New York Times, July 7, 2009. 
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Bonauto has briefly addressed the backlash hypothesis directly,43 arguing that there is no 
real backlash to marriage equality litigation.  Instead, Bonauto argues that the negative political 
agitation around marriage litigation is more “‘lash’ than ‘backlash’” since many right-wing 
organizations have mobilized against marriage equality before litigation ran its course, as if the 
mere suggestion of equality is enough to provoke further lashing by those opposed to marriage 
equality.44  Bonauto’s comments on the backlash hypothesis are the only such comments from an 
attorney involved in marriage equality litigation in the literature.  There has been little to no 
research on what activists think of the hypothesis.  There is no research specifically on whether 
or not the backlash hypothesis features in organizations’ strategic calculus, and, if so, how.  This 
thesis will seek to begin to fill this gap in the literature. 
While there has been no research on the backlash hypothesis’s place in the strategizing of 
the organizations working toward marriage equality, there has been debate over the role of civil 
unions.  Civil unions may be seen as a strategy by which to mitigate the backlash from marriage 
litigation, since civil unions avoid using the term “marriage” in reference to same-sex couples.  
Eskridge has argued45 that civil unions are necessary to build the requisite political support for 
marriage equality.  Ronald Shaiko, writing years after Eskridge, agrees with this conclusion.46  
Other scholars have argued against this “incrementalist” approach.  One such scholar is Erez 
Aloni, who, in a cross-national study of marriage equality movements,47concludes that civil 
unions are actually a stumbling block on the road to full marriage equality.  Marriage equality 
activists have also been vocally opposed to civil unions.  As early as 2001, Beth Robinson 
                                                      
43 In “Goodridge in Context.” 
44 Ibid., 65-66. 
45 In Equality Practice. 
46 In “Same-Sex Marriage, GLBT Organizations, and the Lack of Spirited Political Engagement,” in The Politics of 
Same-Sex Marriage. 
47 “Incrementalism, Civil Unions and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage.” 
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argued that “civil unions would not be the end of the line” after the Vermont state legislature 
enacted the first-in-the-nation civil unions law in 2000.48  Bonauto has also made her opposition 
to civil unions well known in her writings.49  However, given the recent massive shifts in public 
opinion, there has been no work done on the place of civil unions in the current strategy of the 
organizations working toward marriage equality.  This thesis seeks to rectify that. 
There is also little research on the role of courtroom defeats in the strategy of 
organizations advocating marriage equality.  This deals with a different type of outcome than the 
backlash scholarship, since litigation defeats must be dealt with completely differently than 
political ramifications of judicial decisions.  Steven A. Boutcher argued that50 losses in court 
give substantial mobilizing power to social movements.  NeJaime also studied51 the effect of 
losses in litigation on the LGB rights movement and concluded that such losses actually provide 
effective talking points and rallying cries for movement organizations.  This thesis will fill the 
gap on what the organizations working toward marriage equality do when defeat comes in the 
form of an adverse judicial decision, and not just as political fallout from a positive judicial 
decision. 
C.  Legal Strategy 
 There is extensive literature on what the legal advocates for marriage equality should do 
and what they have done in terms of legal strategy.  However, there is no research on the effect 
political strategies had on legal strategies or vice versa.  The Harvard Law Review published an 
entire note in its June 2004 edition on how litigators could attack the federal Defense of Marriage 
                                                      
48 Robinson, “The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont,” 253. 
49 Specifically, “Goodridge in Context,” 24, and “Ending Marriage Discrimination,” Suffolk University Law Review 
40, no. 4 (2007): 837. 
50 In “Making Lemonade: Turning Adverse Decisions into Opportunities for Mobilization,” AMICI (American 
Sociological Association), (Fall 2005). 
51 In “Winning Through Losing,” Iowa Law Review 96 (2011): 941-1012. 
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Act.52  The Harvard note advanced both Due Process and Equal Protection – on rational basis 
grounds no less – challenges to DOMA.  Other scholars, such as Courtney A. Powers, have 
argued53 that the LGB community must be found a suspect class by courts in their equal 
protection analysis, thus triggering heightened or strict judicial scrutiny of laws affecting LGB 
people.  Kenji Yoshino also argued54 during the 1990s in favor of finding the LGB community a 
suspect class.  However, Yoshino has more recently switched to arguing55 that Due Process, or at 
least “liberty-based” arguments, may fare better in the current federal court system, especially in 
the Supreme Court.  Yoshino points out that the Court has shown a recent tendency to reject 
Equal Protection civil rights arguments, but has accepted Due Process or liberty-based civil 
rights claims.  Evan Wolfson, founder of Freedom to Marry, has argued56 that marriage is a right 
and should be won with arguments about its inherent importance to liberty and freedom.  These 
can be either Due Process arguments or fundamental rights arguments in Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.  Bonauto has also supported fundamental rights arguments based on Due Process 
in support of marriage equality.57   She has also explained why she believes sex discrimination 
arguments are weak.  In her analysis, both men and women are disadvantaged, so no sex-based 
argument may be made.58  Bonauto has also supported Equal Protection arguments, emphasizing 
that all courts should follow the example set in Romer, in which the Supreme Court used rational 
                                                      
52 “Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage,” Harvard Law Review 
117 (June 2004): 2684-2707. 
53 In “Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s 
Application of Heightened Scrutiny,” Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 17 (2010): 385-398. 
54 In “Suspect Symbols: the Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays,” Columbia Law Review 96 
(1996): 1753-1843. 
55 In Covering: the Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights (New York: Random House, 2006). 
56 In Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality, and Gay People’s Right to Marry (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2004). 
57 Ibid, 844-845. 
58 Ibid., 833.  This is in direct rebuttal to the reasoning of the respective courts in Baehr v. Lewin and Brause v. 
Bureau of Vital Statistics. 
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basis scrutiny, but still struck down an anti-gay referendum in Colorado.59 
 Despite this and other debate over both the proper arguments to use and the reasoning 
courts and attorneys have used, there is little research on how, if at all, the political and the legal 
strategies of the organizations litigating marriage equality interact.  This thesis will fill that gap 
by examining how, if at all, the political and legal strategies of such organizations influenced 
each other. 
D.  Political Strategy 
 As mentioned earlier, most scholars have argued that the political and legal sides of the 
campaign for marriage equality are inextricably linked.  They have both explicitly and implicitly 
argued in that vein by discussing the political maneuvers of the organizations that advocate for 
marriage equality along with their legal maneuvers.  Beth Robinson explained,60 just after the 
enactment of civil unions in Vermont, some of the grass roots organizing, political mobilization 
and lobbying that accompanied the litigation in Baker v. State of Vermont.  Bonauto has also 
explained61 some of what GLAD did to prepare for Goodridge in Massachusetts, as well as what 
GLAD did afterwards to ensure there was no political derailment of the progress to marriage 
equality.  Among scholars, Pinello has done the most to demonstrate the political strategies and 
actions of the organizations and individuals working toward marriage equality.62  However, his 
study on the matter, which, like this paper, uses interviews intensively, is now many years out of 
date.  The rapid changes in public opinion over the last decade and changes in the methods of 
litigation require a revisiting of the material Pinello covered years ago.  This thesis will also fill 
the gap left by the silence of many activists on what exactly they do to politically mobilize the 
                                                      
59 Bonauto, “Ending Marriage Discrimination,” 849. 
60 In “The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont.” 
61 In “Goodridge in Context.” 
62 In America’s Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage. 
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LGB community and its allies.  This thesis will also fill the gap in the literature on how 
organizations that advocate for marriage equality attempt to reach out to other, non-LGB groups 
in society so as to win them over. 
  24 
V.  A Short History of Marriage Equality Litigation 
A.  Overview 
 Kevin Cathcart, the Executive Director of Lambda Legal, explained in an interview with 
the author that “every victory stands on the shoulders of a bunch that came before.”63  According 
to Cathcart, the burst of litigation in 2013 after U.S. v. Windsor was in part due to the favorable 
decision in Windsor, but also due to favorable decisions from years before.  Looking ahead, 
Cathcart predicted that every case filed until the Supreme Court rules affirmatively on marriage 
equality will also talk about Lawrence v. Texas, Romer v. Evans, and others.  Furthermore, the 
members of the organizations that advocate for marriage equality have learned just as much, if 
not more, from their defeats than from their victories.  Those members of such organizations 
look back across decades of litigation to craft current and future strategy.  As such, past cases 
feature prominently in attorneys’ thinking.  To properly understand the current and even future 
strategies of organizations advocating for marriage equality, one must first understand the major 
marriage equality cases of the past. These cases are highly complex, but a short description of 
each will suffice for current purposes.  This list of cases should not be seen as an exhaustive 
archive of all marriage equality litigation.  Such an exhaustive study is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Only cases that are indicative of broader, important trends, or cases that feature 
prominently in present-day strategizing will be analyzed.  Each of these cases, as will become 
clear in the comments of the current leaders of the organizations involving in marriage equality 
litigation, continues to impact the strategies of those organizations. 
B.  The First Cases (1970-1985) 
 Individuals and organizations have utilized litigation in their attempt to achieve marriage 
equality since the 1970s.  Some of the first gay rights cases were marriage cases filed in that 
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decade.  The first marriage cases came soon after the Stonewall Riots in New York City during 
June 1969, which scholars cite as the start of the modern LGB rights movement.64 The new LGB 
rights movement hoped to model itself after the Civil Rights Movement, and thus also turned to 
litigation as well as direct action.65  However, the first cases brought to court met with almost 
derisive rejection from the various courts that dealt with them.  The first two decades of marriage 
equality litigation thus ended with no legal progress for the same-sex couples in court and little 
success in state legislatures.  However, the filing of marriage cases did move marriage equality 
into public debate.  Although success was not forthcoming, visibility was. 
The first marriage equality case was Baker v. Nelson,66 which was filed in Minnesota, 
reaching in the state’s supreme court by 1971.  The two plaintiffs in the case, “Richard John 
Baker and James Michael McConnell, both adult male persons, made application to [the] 
respondent, Gerald R. Nelson, clerk of Hennepin County District Court, for a marriage license” 
but Nelson declined to issue one on the grounds that the laws of Minnesota did not allow for 
same-sex marriages.67  The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that, although the laws of Minnesota 
did not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages, “a sensible reading” of the applicable statute – i.e. 
one relying on a 1966 dictionary definition of the word marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman – disclosed a legislative intent to limit marriages to heterosexual couples.68  Furthermore, 
the unanimous opinion held that the marriage statutes, as they stood and as they were interpreted, 
did not violate any provision of the United States constitution.69  Appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court due to rules that mandated appeal of all state supreme court decisions that dealt 
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65 Ibid., 140. 
66 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).   
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 187. 
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with constitutional objections to laws, Baker was dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
question.70  This dismissal was essentially a ruling upon the merits of the case, and it made the 
decision of the Minnesota court binding precedent.71 
 The next major marriage equality case was Jones v. Hallahan,72 which reached the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1973.  In Jones v. Hallahan, two women sued the clerk of the 
Jefferson County Court after he refused to issue a marriage license to them.73  The Court of 
Appeals relied on definitions of marriage found in common dictionaries, legal dictionaries, and 
encyclopedias.  Based on these authorities, the court held that the women had no constitutional 
claim since marriage had always been understood as the union of one man and one woman.74  
The court also relied on Baker v. Nelson, which it treated as binding precedent on the 
constitutional issues (i.e. violation of the freedom of religion, freedom of association, the right to 
marry and the Eighth Amendment) raised by the two women.75  In this way, the first marriage 
equality case decided the outcome of the second marriage equality case. 
 The third marriage equality case in the 1970s was also decided along the same lines as 
Baker v. Nelson and Jones.  That third case, Singer v. Hara,76 reached the Washington Court of 
Appeals for the First District in 1974.  Messrs Singer and Bartwick applied for a marriage license 
from Lloyd Hara, the auditor of Kings County in Washington.  When Hara refused to grant one, 
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Singer and Bartwick sued.77  The Court of Appeals held that the laws of Washington did not 
allow same-sex marriages and that such a prohibition did not violate the Equal Rights 
Amendment of the Washington constitution or the federal constitution: “The ERA [Equal Rights 
Amendment of Washington] provides, in relevant part: Equality of rights and responsibility 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.”78  Like Jones, Singer relied on 
the previous marriage cases of the 1970s – Jones and Baker were cited thrice by the Court of 
Appeals.79  Singer was appealed to the Washington Supreme Court, but the appeal was 
summarily rejected in 1974.80 
C.  Victory and Defeat in the Shadow of Bowers (1986-2002) 
 Due to the failure of the first three marriage equality cases, there was no major litigation 
for marriage equality until the early 1990s.  However, in the late 1980s, the United States 
Supreme Court handed down a decision in Bowers v. Hardwick81 that dramatically changed LGB 
rights activists’ strategic outlook and the environment around LGB rights in general.  Bowers 
was not a marriage equality case, but it was litigated by some of the biggest players in the LGB 
rights movement, and it dealt with the issue of sexual intimacy among same-sex couples.82  At 
the heart of Bowers was whether a state could criminalize consensual homosexual sex.83  Mr. 
Hardwick had been charged under a Georgia statute passed in 1819 that criminalized sodomy, 
with the possible maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.84  The Supreme Court rebuffed 
the arguments of Mr. Hardwick and his counsel that such a law violated the Fourteenth 
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82 Ibid., 187.  The forerunner of the NCLR, the Lesbian Rights Project, and the National Gay Rights Advocates were 
involved in the Bowers litigation. 
83 Ibid., 188. 
84 Ibid., 188 & 196. 
  28 
Amendment of the federal constitution.  According to the majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Byron R. White, “To claim that a right to engage in such conduct [consensual homosexual 
sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious.”85  Perhaps even more damaging was the concurrence of 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wrote that prohibitions of sodomy have “ancient roots,” doing 
little to disguise his disdain for homosexuals.86  Such pronouncements from the highest court of 
the land, to say nothing of the actual upholding of Georgia’s statute, did terrible damage to 
efforts to advance LGB rights.  For years, Bowers hung like a pall over the entire gay rights 
movement and influenced all of the strategies employed by its leaders.87 
 Despite the severe defeat the LGB rights movement had suffered in Bowers, just a few 
years after Bowers was handed down, another wave of marriage equality litigation began.  On 
December 17, 1990, three same-sex couples in Hawaii filed for marriage licenses, only to be 
rejected by the state Department of Health.88  Those same couples sued in state court to obtain 
those licenses, and in 1993 the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered a decision on the issue in Baehr 
v. Lewin.89  The court held that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that the 
sex-based discrimination found in the Hawaii marriage statutes was subject to strict scrutiny in 
Equal Protection jurisprudence.90  As such, the suit was remanded to the trial level, where the 
state would have “to overcome the presumption that HRS § 572–1 [Hawaii’s marriage statute 
wa]s unconstitutional by demonstrating that it further[ed] compelling state interests and [wa]s 
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narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights.”91  This was a 
stunning victory for advocates of marriage equality, because it was the first time a court at any 
level had agreed with at least one of their arguments. 
 While Baehr was a victory in the Hawaii Supreme Court, after the ensuing trial an even 
more favorable ruling augmented that triumph.  Judge Gary Chang held that, in light of the 
higher court’s ruling on the same suit, the marriage statutes of the state of Hawaii violated the 
state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.92  Judge Chang further ordered that the Department 
of Health cease withholding marriage licenses from same-sex couples.93  This meant that the 
three couples that had applied for marriage licenses six years previously could finally get their 
licenses.  However, that was not to be, for the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr had 
touched off a firestorm of anti-LGB sentiment across the nation.  By the time of Judge Chang’s 
order, the political branches of the state and the nation were arrayed against the Baehr plaintiffs.  
In September 1996 the United States Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman for 
the purposes of the federal government (i.e. spouses on tax returns and spousal benefits from 
welfare programs), and also allowed states to disregard same-sex marriages formalized in other 
jurisdictions.94  The debates over the Defense of Marriage Act featured unvarnished homophobia 
and bigotry in the chambers of Congress and led to a law that imposed a serious impediment on 
the work of individuals and organizations litigating and agitating for marriage equality.95 
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States throughout the union also adopted “mini-DOMAs,” state-level laws that restricted 
the definition of marriage to the union of one man and one woman.96  This was the start of the 
first wave of anti-marriage equality state legislation during the 1990s and early 2000s.  As the 
table below illustrates, numerous states adopted mini-DOMAs in the 1990s due to the fervor 
over Baehr.  After Brause, and especially after Goodridge, which will be discussed later, states 
began ratifying constitutional amendments to prohibit recognition of same-sex unions. 
Table 1: Statutory and Constitutional State Responses to Marriage Equality Cases97 
Year States’ Prohibitions of Marriage Equality 
1995 Statute: Utah 
1996 Statute: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, 
Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota and Tennessee 
1997 Statute: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota 
and Virginia 
1998 Statute: Alabama, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky and 
Washington 
Amendment: Alaska 
1999 Statute: Louisiana and Vermont 
2000 Statute: California, Colorado, Idaho and West 
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Virginia 
Amendment: Nebraska 
2002 Amendment: Nevada 
2004 Amendment: Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon 
and Utah 
2005 Amendment: Kansas and Texas 
2006 Amendment: Alabama, Idaho, Colorado, South 
Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and 
Wisconsin 
2008 Amendment: Arizona, California and Florida 
2012 Amendment: North Carolina 
 
As shown in the table above, closer to home for the plaintiffs in Baehr, a state 
constitutional amendment in 1998 authorized the legislature to define marriage as between a man 
and a woman, which the legislature had already done.98  Thus, when the Hawaii Supreme Court 
once again reviewed the case in 1999, it reversed the decision of Judge Chang.99  After nearly a 
decade of litigation, those Hawaiian couples did not receive the licenses they so desperately 
wanted.  To this day, attorneys in organizations litigating for marriage equality cite Baehr as the 
reason those organizations adopt strategies that are not merely legal in content.  As will be 
discussed below, lawyers associated with such organizations almost uniformly argue in favor of 
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public education and public advocacy campaigns based on the unfavorable political fallout from 
Baehr. 
 While Baehr worked its way through the state court system of Hawaii, other marriage 
equality cases were litigated across the country, with varying degrees of success for the 
advocates of marriage equality.  In 1995, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in Dean 
v. District of Columbia that there was no “no statutory violation or denial of due process” in the 
District’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.100  In 1998, Judge Peter A. Michalski 
of the Alaska Superior Court held in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics that marriage was a 
fundamental right, which meant “the state must therefore have a compelling interest that supports 
its decision to refuse to recognize the exercise of this fundamental right by those who choose 
same-sex partners rather than opposite-sex partners.”101  Judge Michalski then arranged for 
hearings on whether the state could meet such a high burden as providing a compelling interest 
for such a policy.102  Before anything more could occur, the people of the state of Alaska ratified 
a constitutional amendment that defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman.103  
Just like Baehr in Hawaii, Brause in Alaska offered a glimmer of hope for the cause of marriage 
equality that was short-lived and erased by political action in response to the courtroom victory. 
 There was one major court case in which the LGB rights movement made considerable 
progress in the 1990s.  As the federal Defense of Marriage Act was debated in Congress, the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Romer v. Evans.104  Romer stemmed from a 
referendum in Colorado, which was passed after several local governments in that state passed 
anti-discrimination ordinances to protect the LGB population.  The referendum ratified an 
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amendment (“Amendment 2”) to the Colorado constitution that prohibited such laws.105  Several 
LGB individuals and municipalities then filed suit against the state of Colorado, seeking to 
enjoin enforcement of the new amendment.  The Supreme Court, through Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, was unequivocal in its rejection of the new amendment.  The Court concluded: 
That Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them 
unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a 
stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause [.]106 
 
This was a major victory for the LGB rights movement, since the Court applied rational 
basis scrutiny to the Colorado amendment, the mildest possible constitutional test for legislation, 
and still found it to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Court held that, even 
under rational basis review, a law based on “animus toward the class it affect,” would not survive 
judicial scrutiny.107  The decision was immediately recognized as a threat to anti-gay legislation.  
The import of Romer was so quickly grasped that the House Committee on the Judiciary 
included it in its report of the Defense of Marriage Act to the full House of Representatives.  The 
committee argued that Romer did not disallow DOMA.108  This assertion was put to the test, as 
will be discussed later, a little more than a decade later. 
 Marriage equality advocates had little to show for its efforts in the 1990s, the victory in 
Romer notwithstanding.  On the other side of the continent from the defeats in Hawaii and 
Alaska, though, marriage equality advocates were able to secure a victory at the end of the 
decade.  On December 20, 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court handed down its decision in State 
of Vermont v. Baker.109  Filed on behalf of three sets of same-sex couples that were denied 
marriage licenses, the court in Baker rejected the plaintiff’s claim that they were entitled to 
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marriage licenses under the then-existing statutory scheme governing marriage.110  However, the 
court did “Conclude that none of the interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just 
basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a civil 
marriage license under Vermont law.”111 
The court ordered the state legislature to implement some sort of scheme to extend to 
same-sex couples the benefits granted to opposite-sex marriage couples.  The court did not 
endorse marriage, civil unions or reciprocal benefits as the preferred remedy, merely indicating 
that the legislature had to extend the benefits in one way or another.112  In 2000, the Vermont 
House Judiciary Committee spent six weeks hearing testimony and crafting a law that created a 
parallel legal structure to marriage.113  Eventually, after several tense and close votes, the 
Vermont legislature enacted, and Governor Howard Dean signed, a civil union law that extended 
the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, but did not refer to such unions as 
marriages.114  Despite the fact that marriage did not come from Baker and its ancillary 
legislation, the civil union bill was nonetheless a tremendous victory for marriage equality 
advocates. 
 The marriage equality litigation campaign had two lasting victories in the Bowers era – 
Romer v. Evans, which forbade states from explicitly denying a particular population enhanced 
protection under the law, and Baker v. State of Vermont, which paved the way for the Vermont 
legislature to craft civil unions.  As will be discussed below, both scholars and attorneys in 
marriage equality litigation saw civil unions as a necessary stepping-stone to some on the road to 
full marriage equality.  The marriage equality litigation campaign did suffer many stinging 
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defeats in the Bowers era.  The short-lived victories in Hawaii and Alaska were swiftly reversed 
by the state legislatures, and states across the nation moved to preemptively ban same-sex 
marriage recognition before any such marriages could occur.  The federal government was not 
immune to this reaction.  DOMA became a major imposition to marriage equality advocates and 
same-sex couples across the nation for over a decade.  Throughout the decade, Bowers hung like 
a cloud over all marriage litigation attempts.  However, the civil unions of Vermont and the 
continuing marriage litigation and debates in legislatures brought the issue further into public 
view.  Civil unions also proved that the benefits of marriage could withstand application to same-
sex couples, even if the name of marriage was not similarly applied. 
D.  The Advent of Marriage Equality: the Lawrence and Goodridge Era (2003-2007) 
 After Baker and the subsequent passage of Vermont’s civil union legislation, there were 
no major decisions dealing with marriage equality for a couple of years.  Then, in 2003, two 
decisions of great importance, and one decision of lesser import were handed down.  These cases 
brought about true marriage equality, even though that advent was in turn greeted by a massive 
surge in statutory and constitutional prohibitions on same-sex marriage in the states.  Despite the 
political losses of the mid-2000s, the advocates for marriage equality did manage to achieve a 
major goal they had striven for – actual marriage equality at the state level. 
The first decision of 2003 was not a marriage case at all, but a case revisiting the sodomy 
laws upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick.  During the night of September 17, 1998, police raided the 
apartment of John G. Lawrence in Houston, Texas to find, according to a report filed shortly 
thereafter, Lawrence having anal sex with a man named Tyron Garner.115  The two were 
subsequently charged with violating Texas’s homosexual conduct law.116  After various appeals, 
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the case reached the United States Supreme Court, and the decision in Lawrence v. Texas was 
handed down on June 26, 2003.117  The Court’s six-justice majority, through Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, was unequivocal: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is 
overruled.”118  The Court then struck down Texas’s homosexual conduct law.119  Despite this 
sweeping language, the Court’s majority in Lawrence was also quite cautious.  Justice Kennedy 
followed his statement on Bowers with the following caveats. 
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced 
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve 
public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.120 
 
Gay rights advocates, who had crowded the Court’s gallery in anticipation of this decision, 
openly sobbed as Justice Kennedy read the highlights of his decision aloud.121  The destruction 
of sodomy statutes had been a goal of the LGB rights movement for decades, and at last it had 
come to pass.122 
 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in Lawrence, in which he argued that the 
decision called into question many state laws that had their basis solely in morality, such as 
prohibitions of same-sex marriage.123  Although the majority decision claimed that the 
nullification of Texas’s homosexual conduct statute did not validate marriage equality, Justice 
Scalia told Court observers, “do not believe it.”124  Even the eminent justice could not have 
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foreseen how prescient his words were, nor how quickly other courts would have to wrestle with 
the issue of marriage equality in the light of the decision in Lawrence.  In October 2003, 
Lawrence was cited in the decision of Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 
which dealt with two gay men who applied to get a marriage license in Arizona three days after 
Lawrence was handed down.125  The Arizona Court of Appeals held that there was no 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage and that the prohibition of same-sex marriage rationally 
furthered the legitimate state interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing in stable 
homes.126  However, what marriage equality advocates lost in Arizona was more than made up in 
Massachusetts that same year. 
 Mere weeks after the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled against two gay men seeking 
marriage licenses, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of seven same-sex 
couples trying to do the same.  Although the organization Gay and Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders (GLAD) filed the lawsuit that would become Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health127 two years before Lawrence was decided, the opening passages of the Goodridge 
decision borrowed heavily from Lawrence.128  The Supreme Judicial Court, through Chief 
Justice Margaret H. Marshall, ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the civil 
institution of marriage was “incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect for 
individual autonomy and equality under law.”129  After ruling same-sex couples must be 
admitted to the institution of marriage, the court stayed its decision by 180 days “to permit the 
Legislature to take such action as it may deem appropriate in light if this opinion.”130  As with 
                                                      
125 77 P.3d 451, 453 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
126 Ibid., 461 & 465. 
127 440 Mass. 309 (2003) 
128 Ibid., 312-313 and Bonauto “Goodridge in Context,” 20. 
129 440 Mass. 309, 313. 
130 Ibid., 344. 
  38 
Baker in Vermont, Goodridge was a victory for marriage equality advocates, but immediately 
involved the legislature. 
 At first, the Massachusetts legislature tried to create Vermont-style civil unions.  In order 
to comply with the Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts Senate submitted a question to the 
Supreme Judicial Court on the constitutionality of such a scheme.131  The justices replied that 
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil marriage, it 
continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status. The holding in Goodridge, by which we 
are bound, is that group classifications based on unsupportable distinctions, such as that embodied in 
the proposed bill, are invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution. The history of our nation has 
demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.132 
 
Stymied, the Massachusetts legislature tried to begin the process of amending the state 
constitution to overturn Goodridge.  This and other attempts to stave off issuance of licenses to 
same-sex couples came to nothing, and those licenses were issued starting on May 17, 2004.133  
At long last, after thirty years of litigation and untold years of suffering, the advocates of 
marriage equality achieved the victory they so desperately desired.  Massachusetts served as a 
beachhead for marriage equality, but it was a precarious one, and the marriage equality activists 
would have to wait for years for such a victory to come again. 
 After Massachusetts allowed marriage equality during 2003-2004, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah, and Oregon 
all ratified amendments via referendum to their respective constitutions banning same-sex 
unions.134  This marked a dramatic escalation from the merely statutory definitions of marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman that had followed Baehr but preceded Goodridge.  In 
the face of these laws and amendments, three same-sex couples in Indiana challenged that state’s 
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statutory mini-DOMA, but were eventually stymied by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Morrison 
v. Sadler.135  The court held that the DOMA of Indiana did not violate the Equal Protection or 
Privileges and Immunities clauses of the Indiana constitution, nor did it violate the Due Process 
guarantees of that constitution.136 
 That same year, as the same-sex couples lost in Indiana, another group of same-sex 
couples was challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage in Oregon.  The case arose when 
county officials in Multnomah County (home of Portland, Oregon) issued marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples.  This was part of the “Winter of Love” in 2004 in which numerous local 
authorities issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples without explicit permission from the 
states to do so.137  In Oregon, Multnomah County, several couples, and organizations all filed 
suit against the state of Oregon to uphold the validity of those licenses.138  The suit that led to Li 
v. State of Oregon139 began before the people of Oregon ratified a constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage in 2004, but was decided by the state supreme Court in 2005.  The 
Supreme Court of Oregon held that all marriages in Oregon were both statutorily and 
constitutionally limited to unions of opposite-sex couples and refused to entertain the notion that 
benefits of marriage could be separated from the legal civil institution.140 
 Across the continent, advocates for marriage equality ran into resistance in another 
generally liberal state, New York.  A massive, multi-county litigation campaign, waged by many 
of the largest organizations involved with marriage equality litigation, reached its apogee in 2006 
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when the decision in Hernandez v. Robles was handed down by the Court of Appeals of New 
York State.141  The decision opened with one succinct paragraph: 
We hold that he New York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members 
of the same sex. Whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the 
Legislature. 
 
This was a stinging defeat for the organizations working toward marriage equality.  The 
Hernandez litigation had involved multiple organizations and forty-four couples.142  
Organizations advocating for marriage equality immediately altered their strategies in New York 
in reaction to the Hernandez decision, focusing on the legislature.143 
 Across the Hudson River in New Jersey, the advocates for marriage equality suffered a 
similar setback that same year.  Years earlier, seven same-sex couples tried to get marriage 
licenses in New Jersey, but were rejected, and sued in what would become Lewis v. Harris when 
the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down its decision in the matter in 2006.144  The court held 
that there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, but that the withholding of the 
benefits of marriage from same-sex couples was unacceptable under the New Jersey 
constitution’s guarantee of equal protection to all.145  As such, the court ordered the state 
legislature to either emend the marriage statutes of New Jersey to include same-sex couples, or 
create “a separate statutory structure, like civil unions,” within 180 days of the decision.146  This 
led the New Jersey legislature to enact a civil union bill, which became law in 2007.147 
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 The marriage equality litigation did not meet with much success in Washington during 
2006.  In Andersen v. Kings County,148 the Washington Supreme Court dealt with the state’s 
mini-DOMA.  Although the plaintiff couples had won a victory at the trial level, the higher court 
decided that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not violate any provisions of 
the state’s constitution.149  As with Hernandez in New York, marriage equality advocates in 
Washington switched strategic focus after Andersen, eventually turning toward the initiative 
process. 
 Another litigation defeat in a state that would eventually adopt marriage equality was in 
Maryland in 2007.  In Conaway v. Deane, the Court of Appeal of Maryland, the state’s highest 
court, ruled that the marriage statutes of the state, under which same-sex couples could not 
obtain licenses, were constitutional.150  The court held that same-sex marriage was not a 
fundamental right, that homosexuals were not a suspect class or quasi-suspect class, and thus the 
exclusionary marriage statutes were valid under rational basis constitutional review.151  
Specifically, the court found that the state’s interest in promoting procreation was a valid reason 
under rational basis review, allowing the statutes to stand.152 
 As the first decade of the new millennium wound down, marriage equality supporters 
could claim an important victory in Massachusetts with the actual advent of true marriage 
equality.  The broader LGB rights movement also managed to secure a key victory in Lawrence 
with the abolition of anti-sodomy laws.  Other opportunities for success in traditionally liberal 
states, such as Washington, New York and New Jersey, did not end with marriage equality in 
those states, but the push for marriage equality was building momentum across the continent. 
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E.  Victory in Connecticut and Iowa, but Reversal in California (2008-2009) 
 The year 2008 proved to be an epochal moment for marriage equality, and was a year of 
immensely important litigation.  First, the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
In re Marriage Cases,153 which dealt with the constitutionality of statutorily excluding same-sex 
couples from the civil institution of marriage.  The court found that the right to marry the spouse 
of one’s choice was a fundamental right, and the sex of one’s spouse did nothing to abrogate that 
right.154  The court also found that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, which 
warranted strict scrutiny in California jurisprudence.155  Based on this, the court struck down the 
existing statutory scheme and ordered marriage extended to same-sex couples across the state.156  
Suddenly, the most populous state in the union allowed same-sex couples to wed with the 
protections and benefits previously granted solely to opposite-sex couples.  In response to this 
ruling, a massive political campaign resulted in Proposition 8, a voter-approved constitutional 
amendment, being ratified later on November 4, 2008.157  Proposition 8 constitutionally defined 
“marriage” as the union of one man and one woman in California.158  Just as sudden as the 
advent of marriage equality was in California, so too was its departure. 
On November 5, 2008, three organizations involved in marriage equality litigation – 
Lambda Legal, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the American Civil Liberties Union – 
filed suit in state court challenging the validity of Proposition 8.159  The California Supreme 
Court eventually decided in favor of Proposition 8’s constitutionality in Strauss v. Horton160 in 
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2009.  The day after Strauss was decided and Proposition 8 upheld under state law, two lawyers 
from outside of the organizations involved in the marriage equality litigation campaign– Ted 
Olson and David Boies – filed a lawsuit challenging Proposition 8 in federal court.  More shall 
be said of that suit further on in this discussion.  Despite the fact that Olson and Boies were 
nationally known and highly competent constitutional lawyers, there was great unease in 
organizations that had worked for the cause of marriage equality for years about their case.  LGB 
rights groups claimed not to have known Olson and Boies were filing a lawsuit.  On the same 
day Olson and Boies filed their suit, a group of such organizations issued a statement titled “Why 
the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should be the Next Step on Marriage in California.”161  The 
organizations eventually took on advisory and amici roles in the federal lawsuit challenging 
Proposition 8, although they did attempt to formally intervene when Olson and Boies voiced 
opposition to the prospect of an actual trial on the merits of Proposition 8.162  The federal district 
court rejected their motion to intervene in the case, relegating them permanently to amici 
roles.163 
While organizations working toward marriage equality and the nation focused on 
California to see what would come of marriage equality there, litigation continued on the east 
coast.  Although Connecticut had enacted a civil unions law in 2005, Gay & Lesbian Advocates 
and Defenders filed suit in state court on behalf of eight same-sex couples for full marriage 
benefits, including the name of marriage.164  The Connecticut Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in that suit, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, in 2008.  The court held that 
the existence of civil unions was not enough for the then-existing statutory scheme to avoid 
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inflicting a demonstrable injury on same-sex couples.165  Furthermore, the Court held that the 
marriage statutes discriminated based on sexual orientation, which is a quasi-suspect 
classification eligible for intermediate scrutiny under Connecticut law, and that the state failed to 
provide a sufficient justification for such discrimination.166  In 2009, the legislature enacted a 
gender-neutral marriage statutory scheme that allowed for same-sex couples to be married under 
Connecticut law.167  Thus, Connecticut became the third state after Massachusetts and California 
to adopt marriage equality, although at that time California’s constitution still prevented same-
sex couples from entering into civilly recognized marriages. 
While the legislature of Connecticut enacted a marriage statute that allowed same-sex 
couples to civilly wed, the Supreme Court of Iowa, to the surprise of many, handed down a 
decision that mandated marriage equality in that state.168  Iowa had enacted a mini-DOMA in 
1998, but six same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in the mid-2000s nonetheless.  
When county officials refused to issue licenses to them, in accordance with the law, those 
couples sued.169  That suit was decided in 2009 as Varnum v. Brien by Iowa’s highest court.  The 
court held that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, triggering intermediate scrutiny 
under Iowa law.170  The marriage statute of that time was found to discriminate based on sexual 
orientation, could not withstand intermediate scrutiny, and thus was struck down.171  The court 
then remedied the injury inflicted on the plaintiff couples by admitting them and all other same-
sex couples into the civil institution of marriage.172  Despite efforts by conservatives in the 
                                                      
165 Ibid., 412. 
166 Ibid. 
167 C.G.S.A. § 46b-20 (amended 2009). 
168 Cain, “Contextualizing Varnum v. Brien: A ‘Moment’ in History,” 46-50. 
169 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
170 Ibid., 896. 
171 Ibid., 896, 906. 
172 Ibid., 906. 
  45 
legislature, the court’s order withstood all attempts to overturn it in the elected branches.173  By 
judicial fiat, Iowa unexpectedly became the fourth state to adopt marriage equality. 
The advents of marriage equality in Iowa as well as Connecticut, and even the short-lived 
victory in California, were massive steps forward for the cause of marriage equality.  Although 
California turned out to be a stinging political loss in 2008, the Proposition 8 campaign did 
display the vicious and ugly homophobia that many Americans could have ignored or tolerated 
previously.  The loss on Proposition 8 also radicalized many LGB people who were either not 
involved in the campaign for marriage equality or were only weakly involved before 2008.  In 
this way, as will be discussed in the context of the attorneys’ experiences, Proposition 8 became 
a defeat for the advocates of marriage equality that did have some benefits. 
F.  The Attack on DOMA, Section 3, and the Advent of Marriage Equality in California: 
(2010-June 2013) 
In the two years after Proposition 8 there was a massive shift toward federal litigation in 
the marriage equality litigation campaign.  The focus of the marriage equality litigation also 
moved to the federal DOMA, which had been passed due to the first victory for marriage 
equality advocates in Baehr.  Eventually, one such challenge to DOMA reached the Supreme 
Court in the form of U.S. v. Windsor.  The lawsuit of Olson and Boies also progressed in federal 
district Court, moving on to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and then the Supreme 
Court.  The years from 2010 to 2013 were filled with triumphs for the marriage equality 
litigation campaign and paved the way for an onslaught of private litigation after June 2013.  
These years proved to be the turning point for marriage equality, as legal victories easily 
withstood any political reactions. 
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Organizations such as GLAD and Lambda Legal filed numerous lawsuits challenging the 
federal DOMA.  Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management174, Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management175, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,176 Windsor v. 
United States177, Dragovich v. Department of Treasury178 and Golinski v. U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management179 were filed in rapid succession.  Massachusetts was not filed by an 
organization or a private individual, but by Attorney-General Martha Coakley of Massachusetts.  
Coakley, on behalf of the state of Massachusetts, argued that DOMA violated the principles of 
federalism, since the states have held the power to define marriages within their boundaries since 
colonial times.180  The U.S. District Court for Massachusetts agreed, as did the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit.181  However, the suits brought by organizations argued against DOMA, 
section 3, which prohibited the federal government from recognizing as a marriage any union 
that was not of one man and one woman, on Equal Protection and Due Process grounds.  Due to 
the fact that there is no Equal Protection Clause that applies to the federal government, the 
lawsuits only invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which many Supreme 
Court decisions have interpreted as having Equal Protection aspects.182 
There had been legal challenges to DOMA before this flurry of litigation in 2009.  In 
early 2004, Smelt v. County of Orange emerged after a California same-sex couple applied for a 
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marriage license and were denied one.183  The plaintiffs attacked both California state laws and 
DOMA.  In their challenge to DOMA, they argued the law violated “due process, equal 
protection, and the right to privacy” and constituted sex discrimination.184 The district court 
dismissed the case for lack of standing, but did adjudge DOMA to be constitutional.185  The 
second challenge in 2004, Bishop v. United States, argued DOMA violated both the equal 
protection principles of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the same.186  Bishop 
was only decided in U.S. District Court on January 14, 2014, as shall be discussed later.187  
Setbacks and delays plagued another early case, Torres-Barragan v. Holder, which challenged 
DOMA on the grounds that the plaintiffs were an international same-sex couple, and one was 
prohibited to name the other as an immediate relative.188  Despite these impediments, the 
marriage equality litigation campaign forged ahead with its assault on DOMA as the second 
decade of the twenty-first century began. 
Meanwhile, the aforementioned litigation against Proposition 8 continued in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California.  A massive trial was held before Judge 
Vaughn Walker from January 11 to January 27, 2010, in which the defenders and challengers of 
Proposition 8 called dozens of witnesses.189  Since many of the state officials named in the 
lawsuit as defendants refused to defend Proposition 8, a group called “Yes On 8” headed by one 
Dennis Hollingsworth became the intervenor-defendants.190  On August 4, 2010, Judge Walker 
handed down a sweeping decision that struck down Proposition 8.  Judge Walker held that 
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Proposition 8 did not even have a rational basis for existence, and that it violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.191  The proponents of Proposition 8 pressed ahead and 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The decision from that court will be discussed 
below with the discussion of the progression of Windsor to the Supreme Court. 
The assault on DOMA was somewhat complicated on February 23, 2011.  On that date, 
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that President Obama had ordered the Department 
of Justice not to defend DOMA in cases in the Second Circuit because both the president and the 
attorney-general had decided DOMA should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny, as 
opposed to rational basis review.192  This meant that Pedersen and Windsor, which the marriage 
equality advocates had won at the district court level, would not be appealed to higher courts to 
create binding precedent.  In addition to refusing to defend DOMA in the Second Circuit, the 
Department of Justice submitted briefs in all other DOMA cases arguing in favor of heightened 
scrutiny for sexual orientation classification and against the constitutionally of DOMA.193  Since 
the Department of Justice no longer defended DOMA in Pedersen and Windsor, the House of 
Representatives organization the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of 
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Representatives (BLAG) to defend the law as an intervenor-defendant.  With this new party to 
the litigation, Windsor progressed from the Southern District of New York’s district court, to the 
Second Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court.  At issue at all stages of the litigation was section 
3 of DOMA, which defined the word “marriage” as found in federal statutes as the union of one 
man and one woman.  Section 2 of DOMA, which allows states to ignore same-sex marriages 
solemnized in other states, was not at issue. 
Traveling on a similar track, Perry wound its way through the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  On February 7, 2012, a three-judge panel of that court issued a decision affirming the 
decision of Judge Walker.194  The decision of the judges was rather narrow – in fact, it did not 
fully address the arguments for the right to marriage that Judge Walker had.  Instead, the appeals 
court found that Proposition 8 violated U.S. Supreme Court case law, specifically Romer v. 
Evans, and that voters could not negatively target a specific group with legislation like the voters 
of California had done in Proposition 8.195  Specifically, the Court of Appeals cited the fact that 
the state of California had granted the right to marry to same-sex couples, but had then rescinded 
that right.196  The case was then appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court heard the arguments for both Perry and Windsor on back-to-back 
days in March 2013 and handed down the decisions for both on June 26.  In Perry, the Court did 
not reach the merits of the case.  Instead, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice John 
Roberts, Jr., the Court ruled that the petitioners (“Yes on 8”) did not have standing in the 
Supreme Court or in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.197  As such, the decision from Judge 
Walker of the U.S. District Court stood, allowing the plaintiffs and all other same-sex couples in 
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California to marry.  In Windsor, the Court actually did address the merits of the case in a 
majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy.  The Court held that “DOMA…violates 
basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government,” and 
thus struck it down.198  This was an epochal day for the cause of marriage equality, for not only 
had the Supreme Court struck down a discriminatory state law, but also a discriminatory federal 
law, with much farther-reaching implications.  Attorneys disagree on what exactly led to the 
victory in Windsor, but many credit the “ dual track” political-legal strategies implemented by 
the organizations working toward marriage equality after the lessons learned in relation to Baehr. 
G.  The Windsor and Perry Era: (July 2013-December 2013) 
Following the decisions in Windsor and Perry, there was a veritable explosion of 
litigation in state and federal courts attacking the validity of bans on marriage equality.  There 
were also many cases filed seeking to enforce provisions of the decisions.  In states across the 
nation, private attorneys, outside of the organizations that had brought most of the litigation 
before Windsor, brought dozens of cases in opposition to state constitutional and statutory 
prohibitions of same-sex marriage.  Most of these cases were in federal court, but other cases 
were filed in state courts.  These cases produced a wave of victories for the cause of marriage 
equality across the nation, even in traditionally deeply conservative states. 
  One of the first big victories for the advocates of marriage equality after their twin 
victories in the summer of 2013 was in New Jersey.  In Garden State Equality v. Dow, six same-
sex couples filed a lawsuit against the state of New Jersey averring that the conferral of civil 
unions (as mentioned above in the discussion of Lewis v. Harris) but not marriage violated their 
equal protection rights.199  Judge Jacobson of the New Jersey Superior Court for the Mercer 
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Vicinage agreed and ordered that the state to provide marriages, not just civil unions, to same-
sex couples.200  Crucial to the court’s analysis was the fact that Windsor struck down section 3 of 
DOMA, extending all the federal benefits conferred by marriage to same-sex married couples.  
Since only marriages, and not civil unions, received those federal benefits, there was a different 
injury than when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Harris. 201 
Although the New Jersey state government at first appealed the decision directly to the 
state’s supreme court, the government dropped the appeal on October 21, 2013.202  The 
government’s sudden reversal may be attributed to strong signs from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court that such an appeal would not go well for the state.  The strongest such signal was a 
unanimous decision from the court denying the government’s motion to stay the order of Judge 
Jacobson mandating the state to provide marriage licenses to same-sex couples by October 21.  
Speaking with one voice, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained, “We can find no public 
interest in depriving a group of New Jersey residents of their constitutional right to equal 
protection while the appeals process unfolds.”203  Attorneys for the State of New Jersey probably 
read that language and realized the court would find against the state.  In this way, New Jersey 
achieved marriage equality mere months after Windsor and Perry were decided. 
After New Jersey, which many thought would swiftly achieve marriage equality through 
one means or another, two massive shocks came in the form of victories in federal court in Utah 
and Oklahoma.  On December 20, 2013, Judge Robert J. Shelby of the U.S. District Court for 
Utah handed down a decision in Kitchen v. Herbert striking down the statutory and constitutional 
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prohibitions of same-sex marriage in Utah.204  At least one of the plaintiff couples had applied 
for a marriage license before Windsor and Perry were decided, but in wake of those cases, Judge 
Shelby held that Utah’s denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated both equal 
protection and due process.205  He subsequently ordered the state to issue marriage licenses to 
any same-sex couples that requested them.  Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed 
Judge Shelby’s order on January 5, 2014, 1,362 same-sex couples were married in Utah in the 
window of opportunity that order provided.206  The second shock that came in the wake of 
Windsor and Perry was the resolution of Bishop v. United States in Oklahoma.  As mentioned 
earlier, Bishop was filed in 2004 as an attack on section 3 of DOMA.  However, in the decade it 
took to resolve the case, the Supreme Court struck down section 3 of DOMA in Windsor, making 
the original claim moot.  Thus, on January 14, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Oklahoma handed down a decision on a different issue: the state of Oklahoma’s 
denial of marriage to same-sex couples.  The decision struck down the state’s prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage, but immediately stayed the order to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples.  This immediate stay was due to the stay imposed on the order in Kitchen by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which oversees all federal districts in Oklahoma.207  Bishop may be 
finally resolved when the Tenth Circuit hands down a decision in Kitchen. 
To this day marriage equality cases are being filed in states across the nation, both by 
organizations and by private attorneys with no ties to the major organizations involved in 
marriage equality litigation.  Although the political work associated with marriage equality is 
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still mostly done by those major organizations, the marriage equality litigation campaign now 
involves many attorneys outside those organizations.  Cases range from enforcement cases in 
states wherein marriage equality is already a reality to groundbreaking test cases in states that 
have not achieved marriage equality.  Although this subsection ends the Windsor and Perry Era 
in December 2013, in reality that era continues.  Such an end-date merely serves to provide an 
end to this short history of marriage equality litigation.  This thesis cannot keep pace with the 
changes coming every day to the legal landscape on this issue, but this bit of historical context 
should provide background for the discussions of the lawyers presented in the next section. 
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VI.  Results and Analysis 
A.  The Unity of Politics and the Law 
 As mentioned previously, there is an understanding in the literature that there are two 
sides to every test case, especially in a marriage equality test case.  The legal side of the case, 
which occurs in the courtroom and the judicial system, is only half of the process of bringing a 
test case for marriage.  The other half takes place in the political sphere, in the form of political 
reactions that reverse courtroom victories, or in the resistance of state officials after a victory has 
been won.  All of the people interviewed for this study agreed that there were these two sides to 
the litigation for marriage equality.  To some, to merely refer to the two as “sides” was too 
compartmentalizing.  In fact, everyone agreed that the prevailing wisdom in the organizations 
that litigation for marriage equality is that one must address both sides (or aspects) in order to 
win.  One attorney involved with such organizations went so far as to say that the organizations 
have focused far more on the political side of test cases than the legal side.  Furthermore, almost 
universally, the interviewees cited the negative reactions to Baehr in the 1990s as the defining 
moment in the creation of the marriage equality litigation campaign when attorneys realized the 
political side of test cases could not be ignored.  This shows that marriage equality advocates and 
the organizations they work for are highly aware of the interaction between politics and the law, 
and that they attempt to manage both sides simultaneously, even when doing things that are at 
least superficially either wholly political or wholly legal. 
 Susan Murray, who was one of the lead attorneys in Baker v. State of Vermont in the 
1990s, said that in Baehr it was clear “there hadn’t been a lot of groundwork laid in the 
community, so that case, even though it had been successful at the trial court level, ended up 
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getting short circuited by a constitutional amendment.”208  Thus, it was clear that Murray and her 
co-counsel needed to pursue a “dual track” for every case – being mindful of political issues and 
legal arguments – and needed to “lay the groundwork” in a variety of ways before filing.209  The 
Vermont campaign for marriage equality followed the ancient maxim that one must “know 
thyself.”  Thus, the first political groundwork began with talking to gays and lesbians to figure 
out what issues were important and getting them to talk about them.  Murray attributes this first 
step in Vermont to the passage of an anti-discrimination law in 1991 that protected gays, 
lesbians, and transgender individuals.210  This law allowed the LGB community to come out 
safely.  It was after the passage of this law that Murray and others could talk about why marriage 
was important to LGB people.211 
 Mary Bonauto, the Civil Rights Project Director at Gay & Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders (GLAD) and co-counsel to Murray in Baker, echoed Murray’s analysis.  Bonauto 
argued, “Hawaii was sprung on us,” because three couples went to a private attorney who 
plunged into a lawsuit with no preparation.212  The third co-counsel in Baker, Beth Robinson 
(now an Associate Justice on the Vermont Supreme Court), also explained that “as early as the 
early ‘90s, before we did the things we did in Vermont,” many in the organizations involved in 
marriage equality litigation were keenly aware of the need for “dual track” management of 
cases.213  After the fallout of the Baehr litigation, Bonauto, Murray, and Robinson undertook an 
                                                      
208 Susan Murray, Esq., interview by author, Burlington, VT, November 22, 2013 (hereinafter the “Murray 
Interview”). 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid.  The statute is found at 21 V.S.A. § 495. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Mary Bonauto, Esq., telephone interview with author, December 23, 2013 (hereinafter the “Bonauto Interview.”  
In many of the interviews, the movement members referred to Baehr not by name, but as “Hawaii.”  That one word 
carries with it, for all those who use it, the almost simultaneous triumph and implosion that happened in relation to 
the Baehr case. 
213 Justice Beth Robinson, telephone interview with author, December 30, 2013 (hereinafter the “Robinson 
Interview”). 
  56 
extensive public education and advocacy campaign in Vermont before they filed any lawsuit.214  
According to both Murray and Bonauto, this campaign involved going to multiple community 
organizations to educate them on the plight of the LGB population due to their exclusion from 
the institution of marriage.  The first to be contacted were the traditional allies of LGB peoples – 
“the Human Rights Commission, the ACLU and the UU Church, people like that.”215  After that, 
groups like the Rotary Clubs of towns, which Murray described as “less comfortable groups” 
were informed of the discrimination LGB people faced.216  To ensure their message was widely 
disseminated, Murray, Bonauto and Robinson set up a booth at every county fair in Vermont.  At 
the booth, a seventeen minute video played in which LGB people talked about how they were 
“actually harmed” by the state’s denial of marriage to them.217 
 To manage all of this, the three attorneys resurrected an organization called the Vermont 
Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights (VCLGR), which had been instrumental in the passage of 
the 1991 anti-discrimination law mentioned previously.218  This organization ran the early 
political and grassroots aspects of the marriage equality campaign in Vermont.  Starting in 1993, 
the VCLGR hosted annual town hall meetings to discuss issues, including the denial of marriage, 
for the LGB population in Vermont.219  By 1995, hundreds of people at these town hall meetings 
wanted to fight for marriage equality.  Out of this desire, people in the VCLGR formed the 
separate Vermont Freedom to Marry Taskforce (VFMT), which became its own independent 
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entity in 1996.220  The VFMT then took over the litigation and grassroots organization for the 
marriage equality campaign in Vermont. 
 Murray and Robinson alone easily managed both the legal and political sides of the case 
in Vermont, with help from Bonauto.  The two Vermont attorneys, with assistance from 
Bonauto, could manage the political outreach to community groups and legislators and the filing 
of legal papers.  According to all three, the small size of Vermont allowed the three of them to 
manage the whole campaign.  However, all three were clear that such centralized control would 
be nearly impossible to replicate in larger, more populous states.221  Robinson went so far as to 
say that “peoples’ skill sets have become much more specialized,” so such a model would not 
work, even in Vermont, if an organization wanted to engage in litigation in a “state of the art 
way” today.222  Although there were committees, a board, and dozens of volunteers for the 
VFMT, Murray and Robinson ran the show.223 
 In litigation campaigns outside Vermont, lawyers echoed many of the sentiments Murray, 
Robinson, and Bonauto voiced.  Bonauto did mention that, in many of the cases she worked in 
outside of Baker (i.e. Kerrigan and Goodridge), she oversaw public education campaigns similar 
to that conducted in Vermont.  Evan Wolfson, the founder of Freedom to Marry, is widely 
credited with envisioning and proselytizing for the “dual track” management of political and 
legal aspects of marriage cases, and he claimed to have argued for such strategy for twenty 
years.224  This means he started at the same time the Baehr litigation worked its way through the 
Hawaii courts. 
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Kevin Cathcart, the Executive Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
indicated that, in a significant amount of the litigation Lambda has been involved in (i.e. Varnum 
v. Brien, Lewis v. Harris, Garden State Equality v. Dow, and In re Marriage Cases), there have 
been “robust” educational campaigns to accompany the lawsuits.225  Of course, such could not be 
the case with all the cases Lambda has taken to court – cases like Baehr and Lawrence had little 
public education associated with them – but it was the general rule.  According to Cathcart, not 
only was “the Hawaii Case” the “textbook learning opportunity” for the organizations involved 
in marriage equality litigation on the necessity of public education and political management 
accompanying litigation, but also Varnum in Iowa.226  In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court handed 
down a unanimous decision affirming marriage equality on constitutional grounds in Varnum.  
However, in retention elections the next year, three justices were removed from the bench, due to 
a campaign that focused on their votes in Varnum.227  This was the first time an Iowan justice 
had ever lost a retention election.228  Cathcart described this as a “warning shot from the right 
wing to try to intimidate judges” across the country.229 
As the leader one of the organizations involved in advocacy for marriage equality, with 
the lessons from Baehr and Varnum fully internalized, Wolfson indicated that different people 
usually manage the political and legal aspects of marriage equality cases.230  As opposed to the 
Baker litigation, wherein Murray and Robinson could manage the whole case, both legally and 
politically, more recent litigation has public education staff manage the public education 
campaign.231  Freedom to Marry does the public education and advocacy associated with test 
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cases for marriage equality, but does no litigating, leaving that to organizations like GLAD, the 
ACLU and Lambda.232  Bonauto indicated that, until Goodridge in 2004, she managed both the 
political and the legal sides of litigation campaigns.  However, after Goodridge, GLAD hired a 
public affairs director due to the increased interest of the nation and the LGB community on 
marriage cases.233  The public affairs director was technologically savvy, and was tasked with 
getting the stories of plaintiffs out to the world.234  In fact, one attorney involved in marriage 
equality litigation remarked that the focus in the organizations involved in marriage equality 
litigation has shifted so far from the legal side of cases that more resources are poured into public 
advocacy than ever before.235 
Cathcart agreed with Wolfson, indicating that “different people do different things” but 
that the whole process is coordinated.236  For Lambda Legal, the best way to accomplish public 
education and advocacy is through “earned media” instead of the more grassroots methods that 
Murray and Robinson utilized in Vermont.237  Earned media is coverage from the mainstream 
media, in the form of newspapers covering the plaintiffs’ struggles or TV stations running stories 
on the case and the individuals involved.  This publicity is essentially free, and it allows Lambda 
to “play” in expensive media markets.  As Cathcart explained, “we don’t have the kind of 
budgets to do advertising campaigns the way Diet Coke can do advertising campaigns,” 
especially in the media markets of New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and other expensive 
markets in which Lambda operates.238 To get earned media and to further public education, 
Lambda conducts town hall meetings, brings plaintiffs to meet editorial boards and reporters, 
                                                      
232 Ibid. 
233 Bonauto interview. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Interview with an attorney associated with the marriage equality movement, December 30, 2013. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Cathcart interview. 
238 Cathcart interview. 
  60 
sets up interviews for TV stations, features plaintiffs in Lambda’s newspaper, brings plaintiffs to 
meet state politicians and power players, and utilizes social media.239  For a lot of groundwork, 
Lambda relies on and has worked with what Cathcart called the “Equality organizations” – the 
LGBT rights organizations in each state.240 
James Esseks, Director of the ACLU’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & AIDS 
Project, went so far as to say that merely phrasing the political and the legal aspects of test cases 
separately implied they were compartmentalized, which he insisted they were not in the 
organizations responsible for marriage equality litigation.241  According to him, the prevailing 
wisdom is that there are such various aspects of test cases.242  In agreement with Cathcart, Esseks 
explained that the ACLU has different staffers doing different jobs, all related to the same case.  
There are staff attorneys that work on litigation, staff attorneys that work on lobbying, policy 
strategists that work on ballot initiatives and lobbying, and public communication strategists.  
Esseks explained that all of these people were coordinated in individual states or on individual 
cases to “move the ball forward” collectively.243 
Although different people do different tasks in the organizations’ holistic strategy, the 
need to attend to both politics and the law is taken as a given principle in the organizations 
working toward marriage equality.  The lessons of Baehr and Varnum were hard learned and 
fully internalized.  Organizations have never since attempted to bring a test case for marriage 
without first conducting an extensive political campaign to prepare the public and the legislature 
for the eventual litigation and the potential success of the movement in court.  Since the law and 
politics are so closely bound together in the thinking of these organizations, the next section 
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analyzes the possible tensions between the political messages of the these organizations and the 
legal arguments they made in court. 
B.  Potential Tensions Between Politics and the Law 
While the attorneys in organizations involved in marriage equality litigation are aware 
that politics and the law intersect in their work, they claimed they did not give much thought to 
how the political and legal sides influenced each other.  This is unsurprising, since few such 
attorneys could be expected to explicitly state that their legal arguments were made for political 
purposes, or that their legal arguments were guided by political considerations.  One cannot 
expect the attorneys in this study to explicitly criticize the activities of their allies as being too 
overtly political or legal since everyone in the campaign for marriage equality does have a 
common goal, despite some differences in strategy.  According to most of the attorneys, the two 
sides made the same arguments, though oftentimes with different emphases, and were never in 
tension with each other. 
Murray was clear that the legal and political sides of the campaign for marriage equality 
made the same arguments to judges and the public at large, respectively.244  At no time during 
the lead-up to the decision in Baker did the two sides “step on each other’s toes.”245  However, 
the two sides had to use different styles of argument.  The public political side of the campaign 
told stories of the discrimination and injuries LGB people faced, while the legal side argued 
those injuries were contrary to law or the constitution.246  According to Murray, “there are some 
very subtle legal arguments you are making in any case, and that is not possible in public 
advocacy.  You need to say something that anyone can understand, so you have to be very broad-
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brush about it.”247  As an example, Murray explained that Robinson hated the term “gay 
marriage,” because she thought she was just fighting for the right to marry for everyone.  
Murray, on the other had, thought that “gay marriage” made sense to a lot more people than 
something like “marriage equality,” and thus was comfortable with the former phrase.248 
Bonauto offered a similar example when she explained that the organizations working 
toward marriage equality realized the best way to talk about marriage with the public was not to 
focus on the benefits one receives from the institution of marriage, but the fundamental right of 
everyone to marry.249  Esseks likewise saw no influence or tension between the two sides, except 
with regard to the nomenclature of what marriage equality advocates were striving for.250  
According to Esseks, the advocates now seek and argue for “marriage equality” in legal 
paperwork, not “gay marriage.”251 
Wolfson agreed with Murray that the two sides of the campaign for marriage equality 
never influence each other.  In Wolfson’s work, the public education campaigns have always 
been filled with concepts of liberty and equality, which are precisely the type of arguments that 
marriage equality advocates make in the courtroom.252  There was never any influence that the 
political side had on legal arguments that Wolfson saw, because, to him, the advances in the 
political sphere simply “have strengthened and helped elevate a different emphasis” in the extant 
legal arguments.253  Furthermore, “how people understand who gay people are…creates more 
space for legal arguments,” but did not create new legal arguments.254  Cathcart agreed with 
Wolfson, Murray and Esseks that the two sides did not influence each other.  Cathcart does not 
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believe that the two sides could influence each other because the constitutional arguments – the 
right of all Americans to marry the person they love – are so clear-cut.255 
Robinson was a dissenting voice among the attorneys involved in this study with regard 
to any tensions that existed between the legal and political sides of the campaign for marriage 
equality.  Robinson explained that a tension did arise between the two sides when Vermont 
enacted its civil unions law but other states either refused to recognize such unions or did not 
have a set policy on doing so.256  “As an advocate who was thinking about legal strategy,” 
Robinson had “to be very careful to leave the door open to the argument that a civil union is and 
should be recognized in those [other] states” as the equivalent of a marriage.257  However, in the 
political activity post-Baker, activists had to “talk about the ways in which civil unions fall 
short…[to] persuade…fellow Vermonters that we need to keep moving toward marriage after 
they did this heavy lift that became civil unions.”258  Robinson did not want the political activists 
to simply say that civil unions were not recognized elsewhere because that would jeopardize the 
legal arguments she wanted to make in favor of civil unions being recognized.259  Despite this, 
the argument that resonated with, and received the most attention from, the public was that civil 
unions were not recognized in other states as marriages.260 
With Robinson as the exception, the attorneys in this study unsurprisingly could not come 
up with an example of a time when the political message and the legal arguments of the 
organizations campaigning for marriage equality overtly influenced each other.  Further analysis 
will show that the two sides do influence each other in the work of such organizations, but most 
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of the attorneys did not explicitly discuss tensions between the legal and political aspects of 
cases in a broad and abstract sense.  According to most of the attorneys, the clarity of the 
arguments the advocates of marriage equality must make – the right to marriage is fundamental 
to all Americans, and no American should be treated differently than similarly situated 
Americans – eased possible tensions between the two types of argument the organizations 
advocating for marriage equality must make. 
C.  The Involvement and Issues of National Organizations 
 Marriage equality advocates face the issue of having only a handful of central 
organizations, but fifty states in which to conduct marriage equality campaigns.  The 
involvement of national organizations in state marriage equality campaigns is a case-by-case 
determination.  According to Bonauto, the pushes for marriage equality in Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut were all locally controlled.261  In each of those state campaigns, 
GLAD assisted state groups, but to different degrees.  In Massachusetts, where GLAD is 
headquartered, Bonauto and GLAD ran the entire operation, and only after the victory in 
Goodridge, when “ the entire right wing of the nation was doing its damnedest to pull th[e] 
victory out of the ground,” did national organizations like the Human Rights Campaign step in to 
provide additional funding and support.262  Robinson, who only worked on Baker, explained that 
the strategies associated with that litigation were entirely specific to Vermont, and that she, 
Bonauto, and Murray ran the whole operation.263  Through Bonauto, GLAD was associated with 
the Baker litigation and Vermont’s public education campaigns, but GLAD mostly focused on 
the litigation aspects of the Vermont campaign.264  Additionally, Lambda, the NCLR, and the 
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ACLU all filed amicus briefs in Baker, but such national or regional organizations did not run 
the campaign in Vermont.265  In fact, Robinson argued that having “national groups come into 
Vermont would be counter-productive” because of the fierce independence of Vermonters.266 
 Esseks agreed that all state campaigns, such as they existed, were state-specific, even if a 
national organization such as the ACLU was involved.  As an example, he cited the litigation in 
New Mexico, which resulted in the ACLU and NCLR winning a complete victory in Griego v. 
Oliver on December 19, 2013.267  Years before the paperwork for Griego was filed, the ACLU 
and its allies conducted a massive political campaign in New Mexico.  The national ACLU, 
along with ALCU New Mexico, the NCLR, Equality New Mexico, and Freedom to Marry all 
coordinated to spread the word on same-sex couples’ devotion to each other and the injuries they 
suffered because of the denial of marriage to them by the state of New Mexico.268  The 
organizations put several staffers on the ground in New Mexico to accomplish this and to build a 
coalition of business owners, Hispanics, and conservatives in support of marriage equality before 
the issue went to court.269  To spread the word, the staffers put on town hall meetings, set up 
speakers’ bureaus, and worked to get newspapers to write on the couples in the lawsuit.270  This 
is precisely the type of activity Cathcart described in Lambda’s public education and advocacy 
campaigns. 
 As for what Cathcart had to say on the state-specificity of political campaigns 
accompanying litigation, he prefaced his comments by noting that, until the past year, only a 
handful of organizations, which coordinated closely among themselves, actually brought 
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marriage cases to court.271  This has changed with the Windsor decision and the flood of private 
litigation that followed.  When the organizations brought litigation and executed a political 
campaign to accompany it, they had to coordinate with the local and state LGB rights 
organizations.  This created some conflict.  According to Cathcart, “there were times when 
people in states would say, ‘we don’t want someone to bring a marriage case because we think 
we could move a civil rights bill [through the state legislature].  Once marriage gets out there, it 
gets harder…’”272 Some did not want national organizations to come in and “upend the cart” on a 
long-term legislative project in a particular state.273  On top of that, people within the states 
sometimes did not agree, and oftentimes states would have multiple LGB organizations.274  
While Cathcart acknowledged this conflict and the need to form some sort of consensus with 
state organizations, he did explain, “If we had to have consensus to move forward on litigation, 
there wouldn’t be much litigation in this world, because consensus on anything is hard to come 
by.”275  Wolfson agreed with Esseks and Cathcart, explaining that, while there may be state-
specific plans and strategies, it is all part of the national plan to get marriage equality for all.276 
 Another issue the larger national organizations have to deal with is donors.  The 
organizations advocating for marriage equality get their funds from private donations, and each 
attorney involved in this study had to deal with donors’ desires.  According to Murray, Bonauto, 
Robinson, and Esseks, donors to the organizations have not come to the organizations with 
demands.277  Unsurprisingly, those four attorneys reported never having issues with donors who 
refused to give money after a strategic decision was made, or who wanted a particular strategy as 
                                                      
271 Cathcart interview. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Wolfson interview. 
277 Murray, Bonauto, Robinson and Esseks interviews. 
  67 
a condition of their donation.278  Bonauto did mention that such issues could arise and be a 
problem if one were in charge of a small organization that depended on one or a few big 
donors.279  However, since GLAD is a large organization with many donors, she has never faced 
that problem in her work.280 
 Cathcart and Wolfson offered a slightly more complex picture of donor relations.  
Wolfson explained that “different funders have different agendas and different 
approaches…funders are all over the map.”  However, Wolfson has worked hard with donors to 
bring them around to one strategy.  Wolfson credits the national organizations with succeeding in 
persuading donors “to buy into a vision and a strategy and a campaign.”281  As such, Wolfson 
has never had major issues with donors.  Cathcart intimated that he and Lambda have not had 
problems with individual donors, but have experienced issues with foundations that wish to 
donate.282  Despite this, as Bonauto pointed out, donor issues only really become a big issue 
when there are few donors.  Cathcart’s Lambda Legal has plentiful and generous donors, which 
allows Cathcart to say, “thanks but no thanks,” to foundations that demand certain things of 
Lambda that its leadership do not think are prudent for the campaign for marriage equality.283 
 Another issue the organizations working toward marriage equality struggle with is 
handling litigation that comes from outside the organizations that have historically brought most 
of the litigation.  This litigation can have the effect that Baehr did in Hawaii—the plaintiffs may 
win, but if the political groundwork is not laid, it all may be for naught.  However, simply 
because litigation originates outside the organizations and is managed primarily by people who 
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are not employed by such organizations does not mean that it will fail.  As one attorney involved 
with marriage equality litigation pointed out, Baker, the first case in which marriage equality 
advocates won a permanent victory, technically came from outside the organizations dedicated to 
marriage equality because none of the major organizations started it, although GLAD did assist 
considerably through Bonauto.284  With regard to non-organization litigation, both Murray and 
Bonauto said, “You can’t stop someone from filing a lawsuit,” but explained that private 
litigation outside of the organizations that have had a lot of experience with marriage equality 
litigation can be managed to maximize its effectiveness.285  Bonauto explained that the 
organizations do “engage with them [private attorneys] about the issues…engage them about the 
strength of their arguments [and] make them think more contextually.”286 
Wolfson agreed with this, saying that the organizations work quite closely with each 
other to bring effective cases, but that they do not have a “monopoly on who has access to the 
courts.”  In the cases in which private attorneys bring litigation, the organizations, “try to 
persuade them to bring more strategic cases…and not necessarily go to court just because you 
have a very legitimate and real grievance, but to understand that litigation is a tool, that it needs 
to be used carefully.”287  Esseks offered similar sentiments, stating that, in the case of litigation 
that is not filed by attorneys from the organizations, “you do what you can to engage with the 
lawyers,” that are working on the case to explain to them the intricacies of a marriage test 
case.288  One can also “file a friend of the court brief…and hope for the best.”289 
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Cathcart argued that big national law firms should be involved in marriage equality 
litigation because they are “unexpected messengers” for marriage equality, due to their 
conservative history.  Carthcart believes the “unexpected messenger” story is good and plays 
well in the media.290  That being said, when litigation comes from outside the organizations that 
have experience with marriage equality litigation, it can scare Cathcart if the attorneys have too 
much naiveté about the outcome or forget about the latent prejudice toward LGB people that still 
lingers in society.291  Naïve lawyers often put together plaintiff groups that are not diverse 
enough for Cathcart’s liking and may expose the litigation to problems in the political sphere, 
especially if, as often happens in private litigation, the public education aspect of the litigation is 
neglected.292  Robinson agreed that it is a challenge to manage numerous lawsuits that come 
from outside the organizations dedicated to marriage equality.  She cited the unfortunate political 
backlash to the 1998 case of Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics as an example of what could 
happen if litigation was not part of a broader strategy.293  For Robinson, the national 
organizations need to rein in over-zealous litigators, and also not pressure unwilling states – such 
as the unnamed examples Cathcart cited previously – into dealing with a marriage lawsuit.294  
Luckily for her, “everyone coalesced” with regard to Baker—national organizations were 
supportive of the move to file, but they never pressured her or her co-counsel to do so.295 
The national marriage equality organizations are cognizant of the fact that sometimes 
their interference in a state will upset the LGB rights movement in that particular state.  
However, they are not afraid to move ahead in a particular state if there is no consensus among 
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all the state organizations within it.  The national organizations also have had no major troubles 
with donors withdrawing funding due to strategic decisions made by the organizations.  The 
organizations also appear to have a plan for what to do when litigation comes from outside the 
few organizations that have extensive experience with that type of litigation.  In such a situation, 
the organizations engage with the private attorneys and seek to get involved in an advisory and 
amicus role.  This is the best the organizations can hope for, since they cannot block others from 
filing lawsuits. 
D.  Windsor as the Result of a Political-Legal Strategy 
Every attorney that commented on Windsor mentioned that the victory in that case argued 
that such a victory was due to the political-legal “dual track” strategy that the national 
organizations adopted due to their realization of the intersection of politics and the law in their 
work.  Murray was unequivocal—she stated Windsor was “absolutely,” a victory of the 
combined political-legal strategy of the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation.296  
Bonauto agreed, explaining that Windsor went from being a federalism case to a discrimination 
case.297  The challenge to DOMA changed in 2009 from a challenge to the federal government 
defining marriage (a task historically reserved to the states) to a challenge to the federal 
government’s definition of marriage.298  In a case Bonauto brought with GLAD that was similar 
and contemporaneous to Windsor, she won on the U.S. District Court level in front of an elderly 
Nixon appointee, who ruled for GLAD because the federal government was “treating one group 
of married people differently.”299  Bonauto credits this victory and others in the fight to strike 
down DOMA to the fact that the organizations involved in that litigation got stories of married 
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couples unable to enjoy the federal benefits of marriage out into the media before the litigation 
started.300 
Wolfson was just as emphatic as Murray, claiming that the Windsor victory was 
“absolutely” due to the “dual track” advocacy he has supported in marriage equality litigation 
since the early 1990s.301  Esseks agreed with Wolfson and Murray, but was slightly less emphatic 
about it.  “The win in Windsor couldn’t have happened without all of the progress on the 
freedom to marry that preceded it,” in the courts, legislatures, at the ballot box, and the 
movement of public opinion on the issue.302  Esseks also saw Windsor driving the marriage issue 
in the lower federal courts today.303  Similarly, Cathcart argued that the victory in Windsor was 
not necessarily due only to the political-legal strategy, but to the cases that came before.304  
“Windsor is partly a result of the cases that came before, and I don’t just mean the cases that 
won, or the arguments based on the Lawrence case.”305  Cathcart viewed the burst of litigation in 
federal courts after Windsor as “standing on the shoulders of the Windsor case, but it didn’t start 
with the Windsor case…[but with] all the things that came before.”306  To Cathcart, such legal 
victories were made possible by a line of cases, both won and lost, stretching back through 
Lawrence, Romer, Bowers, and beyond. 
Cathcart took the broadest historical view of any attorney involved in this study, but the 
consensus of all was that Windsor happened because the organizations involved in marriage 
equality litigation adopted a strategy that addressed both the legal and political aspects of 
marriage equality.  According to the attorneys, the strategy of addressing both the political 
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sphere and the legal arguments in relation to a piece of marriage equality litigation has already 
born fruit in the victory that was the decision in U.S. v. Windsor.  The next section will move on 
to analyze the organizations’ strategies and actions surrounding the selection of plaintiffs for 
marriage test cases.  This area of the litigation campaign for marriage equality is one where the 
line between that which is legal and that which is political becomes blurry when it exists at all.  
This also demonstrates the influence the political aspects of the marriage cases have on their 
legal aspects.  As the attorneys explained, plaintiffs were political agents that also happened to 
fill a legal role in lawsuits.  This casts some doubt on the attorney’s previous assertion that there 
is no influence of one side on the other. 
E.  Plaintiff Selection 
The next step in the litigation campaign after laying the political groundwork for the case 
is selecting plaintiffs.  There are two problems inherent in this activity: actually getting the 
plaintiffs, and getting the plaintiffs that will be the best for the cause.  Since the organizations 
involved in marriage equality litigation are acutely aware of the interaction between law and 
politics, the selection of plaintiffs in many ways bridges the gap or blurs the line between that 
which is political and that which is legal.  The plaintiffs serve a legal purpose – without them, 
there is no lawsuit – but they also serve as “ambassadors” for the whole LGB community.307  
The plaintiffs in these test cases are the faces of the LGB population for many people outside of 
the community.  As such, they must do outreach and education, which are political activities. 
This double use of plaintiffs once again shows the attorneys’ awareness of the interaction 
or inseparability of law and politics and also demonstrates concrete strategies the organizations 
involved in marriage equality litigation employ.  Furthermore, the process of plaintiff selection is 
primarily a political one.  The legal role plaintiffs must play is easy, but the political roles the 
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plaintiffs must play are time-consuming, delicate, and highly important.  The attorneys in these 
organizations are keenly aware of the double role the plaintiffs in test cases must play.  As such, 
immense amounts of energy are invested in selecting plaintiffs, and the attorneys always look for 
individuals that meet certain exacting criteria. 
All of this energy is expended to ensure that the ultimate goal of the marriage equality 
litigation campaign is not upset in the political, or even the legal, sphere because unsavory 
clients become the face of the litigation.  Even in legal documents filed with courts, the plaintiffs 
send political messages about the integration of LGB people in society and their similarities with 
other Americans, which are political arguments aimed at drawing the court into a presented 
consensus with the rest of society.  This is a common issue in civil rights movements.  For 
example, Rosa Parks was chosen as the symbol of the Montgomery Bus Boycott because of her 
wholesomeness, whereas Claudette Colvin, who was refused a seat on a Montgomery city bus 
nine months before Parks, was passed over because she was an unwed teenage mother.308  
Leaders of the African-American community in Montgomery thought that Colvin’s situation 
“would make her an extremely vulnerable standard-bearer” for the Civil Rights Movement.309  
Leaders of the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation vet their plaintiffs in the 
same manner. 
The first problem in finding plaintiffs, that of simply getting members of the LGB 
community to serve as plaintiffs in a test case, was largely solved for Murray through the 
statewide town meetings that the VCLGR held before Baker was filed.  The plaintiffs for the 
Vermont litigation were drawn from the VFMT Speakers’ Bureau.  This Bureau was set up in 
VFMT to train people to speak to the public about the issues that face the LGB population.  They 
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were natural spokespeople for the LGB population, so they were natural selections for the 
plaintiffs for the eventual lawsuit for marriage equality in Vermont.310  Robinson elaborated on 
that, explaining that the call for plaintiffs for the impending litigation was transmitted orally.311 
For Bonauto in the lead-up to Goodridge, the problem of finding plaintiffs was even 
more swiftly dealt with because people had been coming to her seeking to file a lawsuit for 
marriage equality for years before she felt she had laid the correct groundwork for a suit to go 
forward.312  Bonauto also asked allies (attorneys and laypeople) across Massachusetts to get 
plaintiffs from every corner of Massachusetts.313  Wolfson encountered the same situation 
Bonauto did, indicating, “Sometimes the plaintiffs come to you because something horrible 
happened.”314  Wolfson explained that organizations also look for compelling stories, like 
couples that could not visit each other in the hospital, or who have been together for decades.315  
Cathcart explained that the methods by which Lambda Legal have recruited plaintiffs for test 
cases has varied from state to state.  In the states wherein Lambda does not care immensely about 
giving opponents to marriage equality forewarning, Lambda uses the state “Equality 
Organizations” because they are usually the largest LGB groups in the state, as well as Lambda’s 
mailing and membership lists.316  Lambda follows a slightly stealthier plan of action when they 
do not want to give opponents any forewarning at all.  In those cases, the method of obtaining 
plaintiffs will be by word of mouth and through allies throughout the state in question.317 
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The second problem of finding “good” plaintiffs is much harder than simply finding any 
plaintiffs for a test case.  As Cathcart explained, “plaintiffs…have to be better than good.”318  
Speaking with some remove, Wolfson explained all impact litigation organizations look for 
“powerful stories and compelling messengers” for their test cases.319  The plaintiffs are the 
messengers in marriage equality cases.  There is an immense amount of media focus on the 
named plaintiffs in the cases, and the plaintiffs themselves are ambassadors for the entire LGB 
population.  As such, the plaintiffs need to have certain characteristics that not all LGB people 
possess.  Murray said she looked for people with specific stories to tell, especially parents and 
men.  All plaintiffs had to be firmly dedicated to the cause of marriage equality, too.320  
According to Murray, she wanted parents because the “big bugaboo of opponents [was:] gay 
people can’t get married because they can’t have kids.”321  To counter this argument, Murray 
ensured that two out of the three plaintiff couples in Baker were parents raising children.322  
Murray also wanted male couples for her test case in Vermont because, in her words, “there was 
– there is – a very big stigma against gay men…lesbians are invisible and gay men get 
tortured.”323  To counter that stigma, Murray brought Stan Baker and his partner Peter Harrigan 
on board.  Baker became the lead plaintiff for the test case.324 
Much like Murray, Bonauto looked for plaintiffs that met specific criteria.  The plaintiff 
couples that Bonauto took on in her cases in Massachusetts, Connecticut and elsewhere needed 
the following: to have been affected by marriage discrimination; a genuine desire to get married; 
the ability to stand up to scrutiny; no skeletons in the closet; emotional stamina; and, the ability 
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to be honest about personal issues.325  Not many people met those standards.  Furthermore, 
Bonauto sought to situate the plaintiff couples in the community.  The selection of plaintiffs was 
deliberate in the pursuit of this end.  All plaintiff couples were selected to, in some way or 
another, break down the perceived barriers between the LGB community and everyone else.326  
Bonauto wanted people outside the LGB community to associate and sympathize with the 
plaintiffs in her cases. 
  Cathcart, speaking for Lambda Legal, echoed the broad statement of Wolfson, and 
reiterated many of the characteristics Bonauto claimed to look for in plaintiff couples.  Cathcart 
looked for clients that could “speak to as wide a range of people in the LGBT community and 
outside the LGBT community.”327  To accomplish this goal, he and Lambda looked for the 
following characteristics: compelling stories, such as long, loving relationships; couples raising 
children (similar to Murray); “people who have faced concrete problems” like the inability to 
visit a loved one in the hospital; racial diversity; the ability to make others see themselves or 
their community as involved in the litigation; and geographical diversity.328  Cathcart explained 
that geographic diversity means different things “in states the size of California, and states the 
size of Rhode Island…even New Jersey versus Iowa” but that such diversity is “critically 
important.”329  As examples to prove the importance of geographic diversity, Cathcart cited 
Illinois and New York State.  Both such states have massive metropolises that dominate the 
politics of their states (Chicago in Illinois and New York City in New York), and often breed 
resentment either “up-state” or “down-state” in New York and Illinois, respectively.330  Thus, to 
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avoid the appearance that a group of big-city LGB people was imposing its views on the rest of 
the state, Lambda worked to get plaintiffs from across both states when it brought litigation in 
Illinois and New York.331  Finally, when selecting clients, Lambda made sure that there was no 
history of domestic violence, nor were there criminal records, or any other sorts of “white noise” 
associated with any of the plaintiffs.332  These sorts of things, according to Cathcart, would keep 
people from focusing on the discrimination that the plaintiff couples were fighting against.333 
Esseks and the ACLU do many of the same things that Cathcart at Lambda and Bonauto 
at GLAD do.  Esseks had some clients just walk through the door, just like Bonauto and 
Cathcart.  Edith Windsor of U.S. v. Windsor fame was one such client.334  However, the ACLU 
also interviewed potential clients, looking for plaintiffs that would do the best job of 
demonstrating the harm inflicted by denying marriage to same-sex couples.335  The ACLU also 
looked for qualities that would make the plaintiffs relatable, such as long relationships and 
couples that had sacrificed for each other.336  All of these qualities kept people focused on the 
discrimination at issue in the litigation. 
Every attorney interviewed for this study agreed that the plaintiffs in marriage litigation 
had to be “better than good” because they had to serve a political role as “ambassadors” for their 
cause.  To avoid clients who may be viewed as unsavory by those either inside or outside of the 
LGB community, attorneys in the organizations bringing marriage equality lawsuits impose high 
standards on those who wish to bring marriage equality litigation.  As mentioned earlier, not 
many people meet the criteria set by the organizations for plaintiffs in marriage test cases.  Not 
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many people have what it takes to be a plaintiff in such a high stakes case.  As Cathcart put it, 
choosing nearly perfect plaintiffs allows for the focus of the lawsuit to be on the discrimination 
they have faced, and not on distracting “white noise” such as domestic issues.337 
The careful selection of plaintiffs in marriage equality cases has not gone unnoticed.  
Some people outside of the organizations involved in the marriage equality litigation campaign 
have asked whether such selection to produce such an atypical plaintiff pool makes for good test 
cases, since the plaintiffs are not representative of most people.  One such person was Judge 
Downing of the Washington State Superior Court.338  In Andersen v. King County, which 
eventually reached the Washington State Supreme Court, Judge Downing observed 
Certainly these plaintiffs have been carefully handpicked to serve as suitable standard bearers for the 
cause of same-sex marriage. Their lives reflect hard work, professional achievement, religious faith 
and a willingness to stand up for their beliefs. They are law-abiding, taxpaying model citizens.339 
 
Despite their exemplarity, Judge Downing worried “if it clouds the Court's view to decide a test 
case with a view to parties who may rise above the median in so many respects.”340  Judge 
Downing decided the answer to his own question was no. 
While recognizing the imperfection of human nature, it is still beneficial to contemplate what we all 
should be rather than what we, too often, are. The delineation of rights is best done with a view to 
human potentialities rather than in fear of our shortcomings. The characteristics embodied by these 
plaintiffs are ones that our society and the institution of marriage need more of, not less. Let the 
plaintiffs stand as inspirations for all those citizens, homosexual and heterosexual, who may follow 
their path.341 
 
As the decision of Judge Downing shows, marriage equality advocates accomplished 
their political goal with its plaintiff selection in Andersen.  The judge was highly aware that the 
lawyers had “carefully handpicked…suitable standard bearers” for the cause of marriage equality 
in Washington state and found that such an atypical group of individuals was actually quite 
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suitable for a marriage equality test case.  There was no “white noise” in Andersen, just plaintiffs 
that Cathcart would describe as “better than good.”  While it is beyond the scope of this study to 
determine if or how much the lives of the plaintiffs swayed Judge Downing, it is clear that the 
judge thought highly of the plaintiffs before him, enough to comment extensively on them.  This 
demonstrates the political nature of the role of plaintiffs in a marriage test case.  Any same-sex 
couple could be plaintiffs to marriage litigation, but only atypical couples would lead a judge to 
wax so poetically in a decision. 
In the final analysis, the selection of plaintiffs, while undertaken to fill a legal position in 
a lawsuit, is inherently a political process.  The selection of plaintiffs is done to appeal to as 
broad an array of people as possible.  This is not fine-tuned legal argument; this is argument by 
example and is political in nature since it attempts to build popular consensus around marriage 
equality.  The following section will expand the analysis of the marriage equality litigation 
campaign into another subject that blurs the line between legal and political: the marshalling of 
amici curiae. 
F.  Marshalling Amici Curiae 
The lawyers in the organizations involved marriage equality litigation do have an 
understanding that marriage equality cases have legal and political aspects that must be 
addressed if the movement is to make advances.  Perhaps in acknowledgement of the political 
nature of marriage cases, organizations have taken special care of one of the most political 
aspects of arguing a lawsuit, the amicus curiae briefs.  Just as in the political action of selecting 
good plaintiffs, organizations invest tremendous energy into acquiring amici curiae that will 
sway courts with political statements as well as legal arguments.  Every attorney in this study 
indicated that the amicus briefs are of great import in the cases, not only for what they say, but 
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also for who writes them.  Sometimes the biggest political statement an amicus organization can 
make is placing its name on a brief, signaling to the court that the organization supports marriage 
equality.  As with carefully selected plaintiffs, amici curiae are in a legal position in a lawsuit, 
but their activity in marriage equality cases is almost wholly political. 
Although numerous amici weighed in during the Baehr litigation, the first major amicus 
campaign marriage equality advocates undertook was in Vermont during the Baker litigation.  
Murray explained that the amicus briefs in Baker served multiple purposes.  Amicus briefs 
needed to bring arguments that could not be given much room in the principal briefs of the case.  
The overall strategy was to let the principal briefs focus on the legal arguments, while the amicus 
briefs were for arguments that the Baker counsel though might sway the court or a single justice, 
but were not worthy of full mention in the principal brief.342  Arguments about applying higher 
standards of review to classifications based on sexual orientation were left to the amicus briefs of 
major national organizations in the LGB rights movement, and not the principle brief.343 
Robinson expanded upon this point, explaining that Lambda Legal argued that 
prohibiting marriage equality constituted sexual orientation discrimination in their amicus 
brief.344  The National Organization for Women and the National Center for Lesbian Rights then 
argued in their briefs that prohibiting marriage equality constituted sex discrimination.345  
Wolfson agreed with Murray and Robinson, stating that the amicus briefs were for “arguments 
that you don’t have space to make, or that someone else has a stronger voice or greater expertise 
to make that will round out the core set of arguments.”346  The key to a successful amici 
campaign, according to Wolfson, was finding who will “resonate with the court, even if the 
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content of what they’re saying isn’t very different,” from what the lawyers or other amici 
argue.347  An amicus that resonates with the court might be a powerful business group or other 
organization that has considerable sway outside of the courtroom that the court would be aware 
of.  In some ways, the messenger to the court is more important than the message itself. 
The amicus briefs also needed to bring various voices to the court that the marriage 
equality advocates wanted the court to hear.  Thus, the Baker attorneys focused on getting a brief 
from clergy in Vermont to rebut the argument that marriage equality “goes against God’s 
law.”348  Murray and her co-counsel also arranged for a brief from psychologists to address “the 
kid issue” and rebut the argument “that kids are going to be screwed up if they get raised by gay 
people.”349  In this way, the attorneys in Baker addressed concerns that were political, not legal, 
in that they did not deal with standards of judicial scrutiny or legal rules. 
 When conducting her own amici campaigns, Bonauto focused on getting “genuine 
experts…with no ax to grind” to address the court.350  For example, in Goodridge, Bonauto 
managed to have the two best-known family law attorneys in Massachusetts compose a brief 
debunking the argument that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry because they 
could not procreate.351  Not only were the attorneys well known and widely acknowledged as the 
foremost experts in Massachusetts’s family law, but also “not in any way could anyone accuse 
them of being great gay rights supporters.”352  Bonauto also looked for the unusual voices that 
the court might be surprised to hear in support of marriage equality.  The best example of this 
was in the Windsor litigation when Bonauto and others arranged to have 286 of the Fortune 500 
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companies sign on to a brief explaining how DOMA was bad for business.353  The businesses 
added a new voice, one the court was not expecting, and also served as a symbol of how much 
public perception had changed to be in favor of marriage equality.  Once again, the messengers 
to the court were just as important as the message they bore. 
 Bonauto’s prominence and skill at conducting amici campaigns is such that, when asked 
how to make a good amici campaign, Esseks replied, “you talk to Mary Bonauto.”354  Esseks 
went on to elaborate on what he and the ACLU sought in amicus briefs for marriage cases.  
Esseks looks for “religious voices, business voices, conservative voices, [and] unexpected 
messengers.”355  Esseks particularly likes utilizing unexpected messengers because they ensure 
that the briefs will actually be read in cases were there are numerous lengthy briefs.356 
 Similarly, Cathcart explained that he and Lambda look for “as broad a coalition of voices 
as possible,” in the amicus briefs.357  Thus, he looks for political leaders, religious leaders, civil 
rights organizations and organizations with good name recognition.358  Just as important as the 
actual argument of the brief and the organization signing off on it is the law firm that assists in 
the composition of the brief.  Cathcart noted that there has been a massive shift in recent years, 
with more and more major national law firms assisting in the composition of amicus briefs for 
marriage cases.359  This is especially interesting to Cathcart because it used to be that one could 
not be gay and work for a major law firm because they were so conservative.360  To Cathcart, the 
fact that major firms actively assist with amicus briefs in marriage cases, even though they make 
little money on them and might jeopardize client relations, is a sign of changes in society that 
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have already occurred that favor the adoption of marriage equality.361  This is especially helpful, 
because the major firms are “a world the judges know,” and they will realize that the legal 
establishment is on the side of marriage equality when at one point it was quite conservative on 
that issue.362  Thus, to Cathcart, even “the messenger for the messenger” is important in amicus 
briefs.363 
 All the attorneys interviewed for this study recognize the importance of good amici 
curiae, and thus seeks out amici that will sway courts.  The manner by which good amici sway 
courts is not merely through legal arguments.  The presence of major national law firms on the 
briefs signals to courts that the national legal establishment is in favor of marriage equality.  
Briefs from clergy, psychologists, and family law specialists also put the lie to common 
stereotypes and arguments against marriage equality.  Business and conservative voices in briefs 
will also alert judges to the fact that marriage equality is not a fringe or partisan issue, but a 
mainstream one that affects many segments of the population.  These arguments, in contrast to 
the legal arguments offered by amici like the ACLU and NCLR, are inherently political 
arguments.  In selecting and courting amici, the attorneys in the organizations pursuing marriage 
equality litigation demonstrate their understanding of the intersection of the law and politics.  
The next section will analyze how far that understanding goes toward an acceptance of the 
scholarly literature’s backlash hypothesis. 
G.  Backlash 
 As mentioned previously in the literature review, a great controversy in the scholarly 
literature on the marriage equality litigation campaign is over the presence of “backlash.”  This 
backlash hypothesis presupposes an intersection of the law and politics, which the attorneys in 
                                                      
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Ibid. 
  84 
this study accept as well.  However, those attorneys are not completely willing to take the next 
analytical step and refer to the political resistance it faces due to legal victories as “backlash.”  
When the attorneys interviewed in this study brought their test cases to court, they were all aware 
of the possibility of resistance, but not all of them actually referred to that resistance as backlash.  
In fact, a couple argued that the term “backlash” is not even the correct term to use in the context 
of marriage equality litigation.  Nonetheless, the attorneys were aware of the potential for 
adverse reactions after a favorable court decision came down.  This shows the attorneys in the 
organizations responsible for much marriage equality litigation have internalized key provisions 
of the backlash hypothesis, even if attorneys do not use the word “backlash.”  While a couple of 
attorneys refused to refer to the resistance they met after favorable judicial decisions as 
“backlash,” they did mention that they were aware of negative political ramifications after such a 
decision.  This affected the political decisions to fill the legal positions of plaintiffs and amici 
curiae in marriage equality litigation. 
 Murray defined backlash nationally and locally.  According to her experience in Baker, 
the local backlash in Vermont was felt in 2000 was “entirely political, in that some legislators 
who had voted for civil unions…were voted out.”364  The Democrats, who had almost uniformly 
supported the civil unions law, lost control of the House of Representatives and almost lost the 
Senate.  Murray thought that the backlash was completely unnecessary, because the decision in 
Baker, in her view, unnecessarily forced the legislature to enact a law to remedy the denial of 
marriage benefits to same-sex couples.  She would have preferred that the Baker court simply 
imposed marriage on the state.  In fact, she and Robinson had premised their entire strategy on 
the legislature never getting involved.365  Interestingly, Murray expressed the opinion that a more 
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radical decision simply imposing marriage equality on the state by judicial fiat would have 
caused less severe backlash than the more cautious decision in Baker that forced the legislature 
to act.  Another unexpected feature of local backlash to Murray was that the debate over 
marriage equality allowed people to express homophobia in ways that they had not felt free to do 
so before.  Murray cited people going on the radio and putting lawn signs out in opposition to 
marriage equality and civil unions as examples of this emergence of homophobia.366  Nationally, 
Murray defined backlash as “one hell of a lot of statutes and constitutional amendments,” in over 
thirty states banning marriage equality.367 
 Robinson defined backlash as the idea that a win in court is subject to a potentially 
adverse public reaction.  She argued that the fact that one must account for this adverse public 
reaction “up front” to avoid negative repercussions of a legal victory later makes marriage 
equality litigation different from other types of litigation.368  Esseks agreed with Robinson, 
defining backlash as “political fallout, political consequences to advances in litigation,” but also 
had nothing good to say about the backlash-hypothesizer critiques of the marriage equality 
litigation campaign.369  To him, such critiques assumed too much compartmentalization of law 
and politics by the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation and tunnel vision on the 
part of the litigators that is simply not true in the litigation campaign.  Cathcart reverted to the 
shorthand of marriage equality advocates to explain what backlash meant to him, referring 
simply to “Hawaii and Iowa.”370  He also explained that the right-wing legal groups, such as the 
Thomas Moore Center, were sources of backlash.  Although he expressed hope for the future, 
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and explained that, as of 2014, backlash has become substantially “watered down,” Cathcart did 
not at any time suggest that backlash would end within the foreseeable future.371 
 Bonauto and Wolfson, on the other hand, do not believe that the term “backlash” is 
correct when applied to the events surrounding the marriage equality litigation campaign, but 
they do acknowledge the resistance the marriage equality advocates have faced in response to 
their victories in court.  Bonauto has repeatedly explained why she is opposed to the term 
“backlash,” as applied to the resistance the she has faced after winning victories in court, usually 
quoting the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., who said that the Civil Rights Movement did 
not experience backlash, but did experience “lashing.”372  According to Bonauto, the LGB 
population has experienced similar lashing.  There was no real backlash against marriage 
equality, just a “continued lash” beginning before the advocates of marriage equality won any 
concrete victories.373  One of the things Bonauto reminds others is that, before Goodridge was 
even filed, there were thirty-six states with statutory prohibitions of same-sex marriage and four 
that had amendments.  “Before there was marriage anywhere in the nation, there were still plenty 
of legislative leaders” who preemptively opposed marriage equality and who “used the initiative 
process as a tool against gay people.”  According to Bonauto, LGB people have “had plenty of 
lash.”374  Bonauto also disagrees with some political scientists – such as Gerald Rosenberg and 
Michael Klarman, mentioned in the literature review section of this thesis – who argue that the 
Democratic Party lost the 2004 elections, particularly in Ohio due to the marriage issues being on 
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the ballot and in the public mind due to Goodridge.375  Bonauto agrees with Thomas Keck and 
others that the backlash hypothesis is far overblown, especially with regard to Ohio in 2004.376 
 Wolfson similarly cites the Rev. Dr. King in his writings and interviews.  Wolfson’s 2004 
book Why Marriage Matters cites the same speech that Bonauto cites when she explains that the 
LGB population has not suffered from backlash, but has suffered from lashing.  King spoke of 
the supposed “white backlash” to the African-American civil rights movement’s successes.377  
However, King argued that there was no backlash, 
Because that gives the impression that the nation had decided it was going to solve this problem and 
then there was a step back because of developments in the civil rights movement.  Now, the fact is that 
America has been backlashing on the civil rights question for centuries now…the backlash is merely 
the surfacing of prejudices…that already existed and they are just now starting to open.378 
 
Wolfson believes that the campaign for marriage equality has suffered from the same surfacing 
of extant prejudices, instead of the nation agreeing to grant marriage equality and then 
collectively reversing that decision.  Instead, Wolfson views the resistance to marriage equality 
litigation victories as simply a manifestation of a “struggle over two competing visions of 
America’s meaning, principles of equality under the law, and so on.”379  This is similar to 
Murray’s description of what she referred to as backlash in Vermont after Baker.  After the 
decision of Baker was handed down and the legislature began seriously debating provisions to 
carrying out its mandate, latent homophobia bubbled up across the state. 
 Whether or not the attorneys involved in marriage equality litigation referred to the 
resistance they faced due to court victories as “backlash” or bought into the backlash hypothesis, 
every attorney understood that resistance existed.  Every attorney involved in this study 
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explained that resistance to legal victories was in his or her mind as every case was litigated. 
Murray explained that backlash was in her mind when Baker was pending, and that she and 
VFMT did everything they could to prevent debilitating backlash by continuing the educational 
process.380  However, she did stress that since she, Robinson, and Bonauto were all lawyers they 
had faith in the judiciary’s power to “protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority.”381  
Murray did point out that other members of the LGB community were much more frightened of 
backlash or political repercussions.  One such community member Murray named was Bill 
Lippert, an openly gay Democratic member of the Vermont House of Representative from 
Hinesburg, Vermont.  Lippert was worried not only that he might lose his seat, but also that the 
Democratic Party might lose spectacularly because of its association with the marriage equality 
struggle.382  Lippert was also worried for his own personal safety; Murray reported that he 
received death threats due to his association with the civil unions law and his open 
homosexuality.383  Despite this, Murray insisted that the lawyers were not, and could not have 
been, paralyzed by their fear of negative repercussions or resistance. 
 Robinson, Murray’s co-counselor and a fellow Vermonter, explained that one must 
always expect some sort of adverse reaction to victory in marriage equality cases, but that the 
intensity of such a reaction was a local question.384  According to Robinson, marriage equality 
cases “are not in a place yet where they can escape public notice.”385  The question for Robinson 
is whether or not the public attention will bring debilitating negative repercussions, the way it 
was in Vermont in 2000 when the Democrats lost the Vermont House of Representatives.386  In 
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2009, when Robinson shepherded the Vermont marriage equality legislation through the state 
legislature, the bill passed, same-sex couples got truly married, and no real adverse reaction 
occurred.  Robinson attributes this to the fact that in 2009 the opponents of marriage equality 
were weak in influence, disorganized, and few in number.387  This nicely echoes Klarman’s 
assertion that backlash only comes when losers in court cases are “committed, organized and 
geographically concentrated.”388 
 Bonauto unequivocally stated she expected resistance in all of the marriage equality cases 
she worked on.  In fact, Bonauto even put the DOMA litigation she was pursuing on hold for the 
2008 election cycle so that the Democratic Party would not be put into a tough place and 
potentially lose votes because of the divisive issue of marriage.389  While Bonauto may disagree 
with some scholars (e.g. Rosenberg) that negative feelings toward marriage equality among 
voters in swing states cost the Democrats the 2004 elections, she acted as if she did agree with 
such scholarship.  This shows the internalization of the backlash hypothesis, even if attorneys do 
not refer to the negative repercussions of legal victories as “backlash” the way Klarman and 
Rosenberg do.  Bonauto also put her DOMA litigation on hold until many years after 
Massachusetts allowed same-sex couples to wed in 2004.  Although section 3 of DOMA harmed 
same-sex couples in Massachusetts “because the federal government was telling these married 
people that they were not married,” Bonauto waited five years to file a lawsuit “for really good 
reasons…we wanted the harm to build up.”390  That way, all the legal and factual arguments 
would be in the marriage equality advocates’ favor. 
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 Cathcart also stated that one has to be prepared in every marriage case for resistance to 
any advances the litigation campaign may make in court.391  The history of the struggle for 
marriage equality has been one of intense struggle to win in court and hold on to that victory in 
the political sphere beyond the courtroom.  According to Cathcart, though, that has changed in 
the past few years.  “Over the twenty-some-year period in which this work has been done…there 
have been enormous changes.  Just look at the polling data from the early ‘90s to last year.”392  
Now Cathcart and Lambda Legal actually struggle with the question, “what do you do with cases 
that no one is defending?”393  As an example, Cathcart cited the state of Nevada’s withdrawal 
from a marriage equality case in which it had defended the Nevada constitutional amendment 
that banned marriage equality.  The state had been forced to withdraw its defense because the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the precedents of which bind Nevada courts, decided that 
classifications based on sexual orientation must be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny in 
Smithkline Beecham Corporation v. Abbot Laboratories.394  Cathcart explained that this recent 
switch in public support and the states’ withdrawal from defense of statutes and constitutional 
amendments is a problem, but “we’ve spent the last decades not even being able to dream of 
having that problem.”395 
 Esseks agreed with Cathcart and Bonauto that backlash must be expected in every 
marriage equality case, but he argued that the dip in public support that usually follows marriage 
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equality victories in court “tends to turn around” once one takes a longer view of time.396  
Wolfson also agreed that resistance must be expected, and that the work of blunting the ferocity 
of that resistance “is not done simply by filing a brief or getting a ruling.”397  However, he did 
allude to the fact that this understanding was not shared by all lawyers and plaintiffs involved in 
marriage equality litigation, perhaps referring to the private attorneys and individual plaintiffs 
outside of the national marriage equality organizations who still file cases in favor of marriage 
equality.398 
As Cathcart mentioned, there has been a massive shift in public opinion that has resulted 
in decreased vigor for defense of statutes and constitutional amendments banning marriage 
equality.  However, every attorney involved in this study explained that the United States as a 
whole has not reached the end of resistance to the victories of marriage equality advocates in 
court.  Every attorney explained that marriage equality cases must still be filed with the 
expectation of resistance outside the courtroom, even if marriage equality advocates secure a 
victory in court. 
H.  Backlash Due to Prematurity: Was Marriage Foisted on the LGB Rights Movement? 
The following section analyzes a different resistance issue: whether the resistance 
marriage equality advocates suffered was due to the fact that the marriage issue was imposed on 
the broader LGB rights movement.  If such imposition actually occurred, it may explain the 
debilitating early resistance the litigation campaign faced because the LGB rights organizations 
had been unable to do the requisite preparatory political groundwork. 
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According to some scholars, the marriage issue arrived rather suddenly in the LGB rights 
movement and was not welcomed by all.399  The same scholars argue that the broader movement 
changed because of the rise of the marriage equality litigation campaign within the broader LGB 
rights movement.  D’Emilio notes the suddenness of marriage’s arrival on the national stage with 
the decision in Baehr, a decision the United States at large was wholly unprepared for.400  
D’Emilio also points out that the organizations in the LGB rights movement themselves was not 
wholly supportive of marriage.  Two LGB rights advocates, Paula Ettelbrick and Tom Stoddard, 
toured the nation in the 1980s and 1990s for Lambda Legal, publically debating the merits of 
marriage as a goal for the LGB rights movement, with Ettelbrick arguing against it and Stoddard 
arguing for it.401  This was a real debate in the LGB rights movement, since many members of 
the movement organizations agreed with Ettelbrick and believed they should create their own 
types of relationships.  Other issues, such as AIDS research, bullying of LGB children, and 
employment discrimination were seen by many as more pressing issues for LGB people than 
marriage.  According to D’Emilio, many factors, such as the New Right’s emphasis on family 
values and the aging of the Stonewall Generation, according to D’Emilio, led to marriage 
becoming the prominent issue of the LGB rights movement.402 
Pinello’s study of the marriage equality campaign of the early 2000s quotes Evan 
Wolfson to explain how the LGB rights movement changed due to the advent of marriage as an 
issue after Baehr.  According to Wolfson, the entire organizational structure of the LGB rights 
movement changed to lay the groundwork for marriage equality litigation.403  The “Equality 
Federation of statewide groups” was formed to bring all LGB rights groups into the same 
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strategy and to keep them all informed.404  The movement organizations also shifted toward 
seeing things in terms of “the cause” and not “one case, or one battle or one issue.”405  According 
to Wolfson, this thinking and organization was completely new for the LGB rights movement 
and happened because of the Baehr litigation and the lessons learned from its aftermath.406 
Unsurprisingly, all the attorneys interviewed in this study indicated that the marriage 
issue was ripe for litigation when it arose in the 1990s, and that it was neither imposed upon, nor 
did it substantively change the strategies of, the broader LGB rights movement.  In Vermont, 
according to Murray and Robinson, the next legal step for LGB Vermonters was marriage by the 
mid 1990s.  Murray listed three crucial steps that led to marriage being ready for litigation and 
acceptance in Vermont.  First, in 1989, Vermont’s legislature enacted a hate crimes statute that 
listed sexual orientation and gender identity as protected characteristics, along with more 
traditional protected categories such as race.407  Second, in 1992, a new anti-discrimination law 
went into effect that protected LGB people.  Third, in 1993, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled 
that same-sex couples could adopt each other’s children.408  This is similar to the incrementalist 
approach that Eskridge advocated for in the early 2000s.409  Regardless of the empirical validity 
of Eskridge’s theory now, at the time Murray was preparing for a test case for marriage in 
Vermont in the 1990s, the legal climate was ready, so that marriage was in no way foisted on the 
LGB rights movement.  In fact, Murray argued, “We went after it.”410  Robinson agreed that the 
time was right for Vermont’s test case.  However, she did explain that she, Murray, and Bonauto 
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were acutely aware that they could not “jump in too soon,” but that they could not be too late, 
either.411 
Bonauto agreed that the time was right for the test case in Vermont, especially because of 
the strong protections that the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont state constitution gave to 
minorities.412  The Common Benefits Clause arguments carried the day in Baker v. State of 
Vermont.413  She also mentioned that people had come to GLAD from the beginning of her time 
there.414  Bonauto even directly rebutted the assertion in “the academic literature” that the 
organizations that brought marriage equality litigation made an issue of marriage when most 
people did not want it.  She argued that they “weren’t the ones taking the phone calls” and that 
many LGB people were angry with her for not being even more aggressive on marriage at an 
earlier time.415 
Wolfson echoed Bonauto, arguing that some activists perceived the marriage issue was 
foisted on the broader LGB rights movement because they were not focused on marriage when it 
resurfaced as a major issue in the 1990s.  According to Wolfson, most of the activist elite in the 
LGB rights movement moved away from marriage after the universal failure of the first wave of 
marriage cases.416  However, he was quick to point out that a mere two years after the Stonewall 
Riots of 1969, which are now thought of as the beginning of the modern LGB rights movement, 
marriage equality was before the United States Supreme Court.417  To Wolfson, marriage was not 
a new issue at all, but one that is as old as the modern LGB rights movement itself. 
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Cathcart agreed with all the other attorneys, but also pointed out that the era in which 
marriage reemerged as a major issue was a massively different one from the current one due to 
the difference in the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s versus today.418  Twenty-five years 
ago, AIDS killed thousands of LGB people and weakened the LGB rights movement 
tremendously.419  In that climate, people were dying, and their relationships were unrecognized 
by the state.  The AIDS epidemic also drove people to fight for marriage because marriage 
offered a reprieve from the grisly battles the LGB community fought for AIDS research and 
other life-or-death matters.  According to Cathcart, marriage was attractive to LGB people of that 
time because it meant they could fight for “something that was happy, not sad,” and that fighting 
for marriage equality was seen as something “that wasn’t fighting against something bad, it was 
fighting for something they’d been denied.”420  Cathcart also scoffed at the idea that the marriage 
issue was imposed on the LGB rights movement, wondering how anything could actually be 
“imposed” on the broader movement.421  Thus, as marriage equality activists lay the groundwork 
for a test case in Vermont in the 1990s, and even in Massachusetts later in that decade, the 
marriage equality activists were ready for the fight that would come. 
Esseks was even more adamant that the marriage issue was not foisted upon the broader 
LGB rights movement.  He pointed out that the ACLU brought the first marriage equality case in 
1970.422  Like Wolfson, Esseks referred to Baker v. Nelson, which even reached the United 
States Supreme Court.  For Esseks, the reemergence of the marriage issue in the 1990s was the 
result of two forces – one within the LGB rights movement, and one without.  Internally, the 
LGB rights movement at that time had many people who were enthusiastic about marriage and 
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wanted it.  Of course, there were those who did not want marriage to be a goal for the LGB rights 
movement, or perhaps wanted it to be a secondary goal.423  The pro-marriage voices represented 
by Stoddard eventually became the most noticeable in the LGB rights movement.  External to the 
LGB rights movement, its opponents flew to the issue of marriage equality because they thought 
that it would be an issue they could win on.424  Politically speaking, they were quite right about 
this.  Esseks went so far as to say: 
If we had all collectively stopped, and filed no more briefs, and made no more legal arguments and 
filed any other marriage litigation, the public discussion would have been focused on marriage 
anyways, not because it was driven by LGBT rights advocates, but because that’s where our opponents 
wanted the conversation to go.425 
 
To Esseks, any “imposition” of marriage on the broader LGB rights movement may have 
partially been due to a strategic choice made by conservative groups, but the LGB movement 
was ready to move on to marriage when it became an issue in the 1990s.426 
 Given their positions in, and proximity to, the organizations responsible for much 
marriage equality litigation, it is completely unsurprising that not a single attorney in this study 
expressed the belief that the marriage issue was foisted upon an unwilling LGB rights 
movement, or that the machinations of external groups and individuals brought marriage to the 
fore without the LGB movement doing anything.  According to the attorneys, the LGB 
movement organizations were ready to fight for marriage when marriage became a national issue 
in the 1990s.  They believe that in some places, such as Vermont, the legal and political 
groundwork had actually been laid before marriage became an issue.  In their view, contrary to 
some scholarly critiques, activists in the broader LGB rights movement did not rush headlong 
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into marriage.  A better observation would be that advocates for marriage equality did not grasp 
the intersection of the law and politics in their work to a sufficient extent before losing politically 
after several early cases. 
I.  The End of Backlash? 
The issue of marriage equality now inhabits a different world than when it was seriously 
litigated in the 1990s.  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has been repealed;427 a majority of Americans 
support marriage equality;428 President Obama and Vice President Biden have repeatedly 
publically voiced support for marriage equality;429 marriage equality advocates have won 
numerous cases in court; and, several referenda have enacted marriage equality.  Looking at 
these facts, one may be led to believe that the United States has reached the end of backlash.  Not 
a single attorney interviewed in this study believed that such a historical moment has come to 
pass. 
Murray explained that it may seem like the end of backlash has come, but once one 
travels outside of the Northeast and the few other states that allow marriage equality by law, the 
resistance to marriage equality is still a reality.430  After all, Windsor only struck down section 3 
of DOMA, not section 2, which allows states to not recognize same-sex couples’ marriages if 
they were performed in another state.  Murray also employed an analogy that other attorneys 
used as well—that of the campaign to strike down anti-miscegenation laws in the mid-twentieth 
century.  According to Murray, the California Supreme Court struck down anti-miscegenation 
laws first, but it took nineteen years for the United States Supreme Court to follow suit in Loving 
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v. Virginia.431  Murray predicts that, since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court mandated 
marriage in 2004, by or before the year 2023 the United States Supreme Court will hand down a 
decision affirmatively in favor of marriage equality.432 
Robinson echoed Murray, arguing a state-by-state analysis is crucial, because she 
believes one cannot treat the nation as a homogenous whole on this issue.433  Wolfson argued, 
“we have come to a turning point, and victory is within reach and will happen, provided we stick 
with the work, but it won’t just waft in by itself or on a wave of inevitability.”434  That work 
includes the public outreach and education programs that accompany the litigation for marriage 
equality. 
While Murray, Robinson, and Wolfson did not in any way indicate that backlash or 
resistance to marriage equality victories was finished, they were much more hopeful than 
Bonauto, Cathcart, and Esseks.  Bonauto argued, “if it were possible still to criminalize a 
relationship between same-sex couples, some states would do it, but it’s not possible because of 
Lawrence v. Texas.”435  She also pointed out that many states that do not have marriage equality 
either by legislation or judicial fiat have constitutional amendments banning marriage equality.  
“Changing the fundamental charter of your government to forbid any recognition of any 
relationship that approximates a marriage” is the ultimate insult for Bonauto, and a sign that such 
states will not go along willingly with court decisions mandating marriage equality.436  Esseks 
insists that the nation is “not even close” to the end of backlash, but he argues on different 
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grounds.437  To Esseks, the fight is now no longer over constitutional amendments banning 
marriage equality, but rather over “religious freedom restoration acts” that permit private 
discrimination against same-sex couples if such discrimination conforms to an individual’s 
religious belief.438 
Cathcart agreed with Bonauto and Esseks, indicating that the legislature of the state of 
Indiana was debating the passage of a constitutional amendment banning recognition of same-
sex couples’ marriages.439  To Cathcart, when a legislature is still debating such an amendment, 
one cannot talk of the end of backlash.440  However, Cathcart does believe, like Murray does, 
that the United States Supreme Court will issue a decision affirmatively calling for marriage 
equality in all states.  The only difference between the two lawyers is that Cathcart believes such 
a decision will come soon—“in the next couple of years.”441  Even if such a decision comes to 
pass, Cathcart believes that the resistance to it would be widespread.  As an analogy, Cathcart 
pointed out that Varnum decided and settled the issue of marriage equality in Iowa, and has 
withstood the test of time despite backlash via the judicial retention elections, but that Lambda 
still has to bring cases to enforce its mandate.442  In 2013, Lambda brought two cases to the Iowa 
Supreme Court on behalf of two lesbian couples.  One couple wanted both of their names on the 
death certificate of a child as parents thereof, the other couples wanted both of their names on a 
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birth certificate as parents.443  Despite Varnum, state agencies refused to do so, although the Iowa 
Supreme Court eventually ordered them to comply with Varnum’s mandate.444  Thus, Cathcart 
foresees massive resistance, especially in the South, to a Supreme Court decision mandating 
marriage equality. 
With still just a bare majority of Americans in support of marriage equality and continued 
resistance to judicial rulings in favor of marriage equality, the attorneys involved in marriage 
equality litigation interviewed for this study do not believe the end of backlash has come.  These 
attorneys do not even believe that the apex of backlash has passed, merely that backlash of the 
future will be different, such as “religious freedom restoration acts.” 
J.  The Effect of Losses in Litigation and the Legislature 
 Although most of the literature on the marriage equality litigation campaign has focused 
on the political resistance or backlash that follows victories in court, there is little research on the 
effects of litigation losses or of national organizations’ opinion of litigation losses.445  This 
flipside of the backlash hypothesis – which assumes marriage equality advocates win in court – 
remains unexplored.  By and large, the attorneys involved in this study argued that litigation 
defeats actually aided the push for marriage equality, despite the temporary setback.  This 
demonstrates a dramatic departure from the internalization of the backlash hypothesis mentioned 
previously.  The attorneys mostly insisted that in the event of legal defeats the political side of 
the organizations’ work was not harmed, and may have even been helped by that defeat.  Murray 
was the exception to this general rule.  Murray believes that litigation defeats are irretrievably 
bad.  “It seems obvious to” Murray that defeats in court would be setbacks for the cause of 
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marriage equality.446  One attorney involved with marriage equality litigation expressed the 
belief that Baker was not a victory because it did not bring about full marriage equality.  
However, the attorney did note that Baker wound up being beneficial in the end because it did 
not derail the progression to marriage in Vermont.447 
 Cathcart explained that, although the line of causality is not perfectly clear, the litigation 
losses in New York448 and Washington449 states helped.  “The public education value…of 
lawsuits that lost” was vast because it opened up space for further public discussion.450  This 
would have been harder without “the blaze of publicity surrounding the lawsuits, sometimes 
even including the loss.”451  Additionally, litigation losses get “earned media” for the marriage 
equality campaign, which is how Cathcart sees national and regional organizations getting their 
message out most effectively.452  Wolfson also cited the Hernandez loss in New York State as a 
loss for the marriage equality litigation campaign that wound up actually helping the cause of 
marriage equality in the long run because of the publicity it received, leading to the legislature 
passing a marriage equality law.453  Wolfson also saw the massive loss in Bowers as another such 
eventually beneficial loss for the LGB rights movement as a whole and the marriage equality 
litigation campaign within it.  According to Wolfson, Bowers “renewed commitment in fighting 
for the freedom to marry.”454 
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Esseks agreed with Wolfson and Cathcart, but went even further, arguing that “every 
single one” of marriage equality advocates’ defeats advance the cause of marriage equality in the 
long run.455  According to Esseks, “we’re trying to get the country’s attention [and] talk to them 
about why these people want to get married, [so] each of the pieces of litigation has started a 
conversation.”456  These cases, even the losses, allowed the cause of marriage equality to move 
forward.  For example, in the slew of marriage cases filed in New York, Oregon, Washington, 
Maryland, Connecticut, and California in 2004, the advocates of marriage equality lost all but the 
California and Connecticut cases.457  However, all of those losses helped achieve the political 
victories in New York, Maryland and Washington.458 
Many of the attorneys involved in this study also largely held the belief that even 
legislative defeats can help advance the cause of marriage equality.  On the other hand, Cathcart 
was adamant that political defeats simply forced people to work harder.459  To Cathcart, “some 
of the [defeats suffered in] lawsuits led to the possibility for legislative action,” but the same 
could not be said for defeats suffered in states’ legislatures.  Esseks gave a mild example of a 
legislative defeat that ended up assisting the cause of marriage equality in the long run: the New 
York State Assembly’s failure to pass a marriage equality bill in 2009.460  While Esseks believes 
that the marriage equality could have come about in the legislature without that loss, it did allow 
for the creation of a “plan of action” for several organizations’ successful push for marriage 
equality in 2011.461 
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In contrast to Cathcart and Esseks, Wolfson and Bonauto both cited the losses in 
California in 2008 and Maine in 2009 as examples of political losses that galvanized the 
organizations and individuals and brought about progress despite the initial setback they created.  
To Bonauto, “Prop 8, ironically, turned out to be extremely helpful.”462  The Proposition 8 
campaign, “put on display for the nation the kinds of attacks we’ve been experiencing…it was an 
eye opener for many” in that it revealed homophobia in all of its ugliness.463  Furthermore, 
“there’s nothing like having something taken away to be a motivator, and so people in California 
were…politicized by this.”464  Then, before Maine voters went to the ballot in 2009, 
organizations dedicated to marriage equality raised a lot of money from small online donations 
from people who “didn’t want another Prop 8 to happen.”465  When Mainers took away the right 
marry from same-sex couples later in 2009, people were once against radicalized and energized, 
which helped the cause of marriage equality in the long run, even though the Proposition 8 
campaign and the Maine defeat caused so much damage.466  Wolfson saw the loss on Proposition 
8 as 
Shocking the conscience of a lot of non-gay people and awakening a lot of people out of their 
complacency and sense that we were just going to drift to victory, and spurred the invention of 
Freedom to Marriage into the robust campaign that we have been since 2010 to win the freedom to 
marry, having been more of an internal movement strategy center.467 
 
Wolfson also explained that, after the loss in the first Maine battle, activists spent months 
knocking on doors and reframing political arguments.468  That effort and retooling, in Wolfson’s 
mind, won the second Maine referendum in 2011. 
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 According to some of the lawyers interviewed in this study, losses in court can actually 
advance the cause of marriage equality in the long run by bringing media attention to the issue of 
marriage discrimination and energizing LGB people and their allies to work harder.  Although 
the lawyers disagreed over whether political losses can have the same effect, some argued that 
the losses in referenda in Maine and California served both as ugly examples of homophobia to 
non-LGB Americans and as reasons for LGB people to engage in activism. 
K.  The Viability of Civil Unions 
 One method by which the advocates of marriage equality have sought to deflect backlash 
in the past has been with the acceptance of civil unions instead of full civil marriage.  Civil 
unions used to be seen as an intermediate step between no marriage and full civil marriage when 
the acquisition of full civil marriage for same-sex couples was seen as politically infeasible.  
Civil unions did not exist as a legal concept until the Vermont legislature enacted its civil unions 
law in 2000, but some469 saw them as a compromise whereby LGB people received all the 
benefits of marriage except the name.  Today, there is much less impetus to fight for civil unions, 
and the organizations involved in marriage equality litigation are less willing to compromise by 
accepting them.  As Cathcart explained, there is no “juice” for civil unions anymore—no one 
lobbies for them because “what people are seeing is other states getting marriage…that’s what 
people want.”470 Cathcart did acknowledge that civil unions, “while a compromise, were at least 
a compromise that moved things forward,” and brought marriage equality activists closer to their 
ultimate goal of marriage equality.471 
 Robinson agreed with Cathcart and stated that civil unions were a huge step forward in 
Vermont in 2000, but that they would have been a massive step backward in Massachusetts in 
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2004.472  Robinson never liked civil unions, seeing them as “less than fully equal” because one of 
the benefits of being married “is the status of being married.”473  The desirability of civil unions 
to Robinson depended on the long-term strategy of the organizations litigation marriage equality, 
which was marriage, meaning civil unions were a bittersweet compromise.474  Murray agreed 
with Robinson and Cathcart, but argued that Windsor, not Goodridge really turned the tide 
against civil unions in favor of marriage.475  Esseks offered a similar analysis, arguing they 
“were never a necessary compromise,” but that they were progress.476  Bonauto offered two 
observations about civil unions.  First, Vermont’s civil union law was “bittersweet” because it 
was “not everything [advocates for marriage equality] wanted, but it was incredible to get it.”477  
Second, even though civil unions offered LGB people unprecedented legal protections, “it was 
not the same thing” as marriage, but was “a separate system for gay people, and it rankled.”478  
Due to all of these sentiments, key members of the organizations involved in litigation and 
lobbying for marriage equality at this moment in time no longer look to civil unions as a 
stepping-stone to marriage.  Instead, key attorneys are now of the belief that marriage is 
attainable without such stepping-stones. 
L.  Legal Strategy 
 Once the advocates of marriage equality reach the courtroom, they can focus on legal 
arguments and worry to a lesser degree about the political aspects of the marriage equality 
campaign.  While the attorneys in the this study were in agreement on the intersection of the law 
and politics, the reality of resistance to legal victories, and the need to address both the political 
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and the legal spheres with regard to marriage equality cases, they were rather divided on legal 
strategy.  The attorneys interviewed for this study were divided on the issues of whether an 
attorney from an organization dedicated to marriage equality goes to court for the client or the 
cause, and whether it is better to use Due Process or Equal Protection arguments.  For all the ink 
spilled over the legal strategies of advocates for marriage equality, there is no real consensus. 
 On the issue of whether attorneys from organizations dedicated to marriage equality go to 
court for the plaintiffs in marriage cases or the broader cause, Esseks explained that an attorney 
from an organization dedicated to the advancement of marriage equality always tries to ensure 
the interests of the individuals and the cause line up, but that the attorney always represents the 
interests of the individual clients above all else.479  Bonauto agreed, stating that clients always 
come first if there is conflict between their desires and the desires of the broader cause because 
“as an attorney [one has] an absolute obligation to the clients.”480  However, Bonauto did qualify 
that statement by noting that the attorneys do, “explain to…potential plaintiffs that they are 
effectively ambassadors, that this case is beyond them.”481  Even when this is explained, 
sometimes the clients do not want to do what the attorneys from marriage equality organizations 
want them to do.  For Bonauto, this was especially present in employment lawsuits, not marriage 
litigation.  Oftentimes, Bonauto’s clients in employment discrimination lawsuits simply wanted 
to get a settlement and move on with their lives, whereas GLAD wanted to create binding 
precedent by taking the cases to higher appellate courts.482  Even though she also wanted to 
create binding precedent, Bonauto had to obey her clients’ wishes. 
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 Murray agreed with Bonauto that an attorney always represents his or her clients above 
all else.  Like Bonauto, Murray explained that plaintiffs in marriage equality cases “understand 
that they represent other people, and the discrimination they’ve suffered is emblematic of the 
discrimination others have suffered.”483  Robinson also agreed, citing an example from the 
broader LGB rights movement of when the clients’ wishes and the movement’s goals were not 
aligned.  According to Robinson, in marriage cases, “the tensions you might have are 
significantly diminished because the plaintiffs who participate in a test case are people whose 
goal is to do something that is good for the movement, and they are not looking” to be unhelpful 
for the movement.484  However, in family law cases wherein a LGB or transgender client simply 
wants visitation rights with their child and not a legal statement from a higher court, the tension 
between clients’ goals and the broader cause’s goals is most pronounced.485  Cathcart also 
agreed, stating, “you have to go to court for the plaintiffs, but if you pick your plaintiffs properly, 
and you frame your case properly, I don’t think there has to be a difference between the goals of 
the plaintiffs and the goals of the movement.”486  Despite the statements of attorneys that the 
desires of the organizations dedicated to marriage equality and their clients can be harmonized, it 
appears that, on balance, the tradeoff between representing clients and representing a cause is so 
fraught that movement attorneys, like Cathcart Murray and Bonauto, must avoid that tradeoff.  
To Cathcart, the alignment of the two sets of goals is made easier by the fact that marriage 
equality cases are about “clear-cut constitutional issues” such as the fundamental right to marry 
and the state’s equal treatment of individuals.487 
 Despite this broad consensus among the aforementioned attorneys, Wolfson argued, 
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The priority is always to be thinking about the broader impact…you have to be very transparent about 
that when you take the case, and need to have an understanding on the part of the plaintiffs that they 
too will prioritize the broader concerns of the movement and the law change we’re all seeking rather 
than win at any cost on their own.488 
 
Although Wolfson did emphasize the fact that the plaintiffs would be aware of the prioritization 
of the organization’s goals, he did break from the rest of the attorneys involved in this study by 
so strongly emphasizing the cause over the clients. 
 On another fundamental question of legal strategy in marriage equality litigation – 
whether to employ Due Process of Equal Protection arguments – the attorneys in this study were 
also divided or were unsure.  The choice of legal arguments can have profound impact on the 
relationship between the legal and political arguments the advocates of marriage equality make.  
For example, Bonauto believes the best way to talk to people about marriage is to focus on the 
dignity of marriage and the right to marriage, not on economic benefits.  In terms of 
constitutional doctrine, emphasizing the dignity of marriage fits better within Due Process 
reasoning, whereas focusing on the economic benefits of marriage makes more sense as an Equal 
Protection argument.  Although the attorneys in this study insisted the legal and political 
arguments do not substantively influence each other, they did indicate that the two types of 
arguments argue the same thing: denial of marriage to same-sex couples is unfair.  Selection of a 
certain argument in court determines whether that actually happens. 
Murray argued that, at least in Vermont, the Equal Protection arguments were the better 
arguments.489  In the Vermont state constitution, Equal Protection arguments are usually based 
on the Common Benefits Clause, which serves the same purpose as the Equal Protection Clause 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.490  Murray based her belief on her 
understanding of the Vermont state constitution—that it was written with the goal of “not 
[having] any people who were privileged over others.”491  This convinced Murray before Baker 
was even argued that the Common Benefits arguments would fare better than Due Process 
arguments. 
 In contrast, Bonauto, who served as Murray’s co-counsel in Baker, prefers Due Process 
arguments in marriage equality cases.  While Bonauto does think that both types of arguments 
need to be included in every marriage equality brief, “there is something simple and elegant” 
about Due Process arguments.492  To Bonauto, the argument that “we are all Americans, and if 
there are certain fundamental rights guaranteed to all Americans, what is the excuse for saying 
this one group of Americans can’t participate [?]” is a more common sense approach that many 
can grasp than Equal Protection arguments.493  As an added bonus, using the fundamental rights 
language of Due Process arguments allows for the marriage equality advocates to talk about 
marriage itself, and not just the technical benefits and protections that stem from it.494  Bonauto 
has also gone on record against the argument that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples 
constitutes sex discrimination.  To Bonauto, “there is no discrimination because men and women 
are equally disadvantaged,” since a couple of men that wish to be married face the same 
discrimination as a couple of women.495 
 Robinson argued that all types of arguments – statutory, Due Process and Equal 
Protection – need to be included in legal briefs because “my view of what the strongest argument 
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was and somebody else’s view of what the strongest arguments was weren’t necessarily the 
same,” and she could not predict with certainty which arguments would carry the day with the 
court as a whole.496  To illustrate the fact that different arguments appealed to different people, 
necessitating the inclusion of all valid arguments, Robinson cited the two moot courts the Baker 
counsel held before orally arguing Baker before the Vermont Supreme Court.  The first moot 
court session consisted of a panel of gay, feminist, and other progressive thinkers and 
progressive lawyers.  The consensus of that group was that attorneys in Baker “should lead with 
the sex discrimination argument.”497  However, the next moot court session consisted of a panel 
of straight men, mostly unengaged from the LGB rights movement.  The consensus from that 
group was “you need to drop the sex discrimination argument – it is your worst argument – and 
you need to lead with the fundamental right to marry.”498  “The lesson is that…this is an issue 
that is not only legally subject to a range of analyses, but it strikes people fundamentally in 
different ways,” and advocates need to be cognizant of this fact.499 
 Wolfson agreed with Robinson with regard to not having to choose between the two 
types of arguments.  Wolfson also argued that marriage equality advocates have won cases due 
to both types of arguments, so one is not especially better than the other.500  Esseks was also 
split, but on a personal preference level.  Esseks personally “is a big fan of the fundamental right 
to marry” because everyone agrees that such a right exists; the fight is merely over whether 
same-sex couples are covered by it.501  However, he is also aware that “we have won [with] the 
Equal Protection argument much more than we have won [with] the fundamental right 
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argument.”502  Cathcart was even more non-committal, stating that “we’ll know the answer to 
that question [whether Due Process or Equal Protection arguments are stronger] when we have a 
win at the Supreme Court, and at the moment,” one cannot prejudice any type of argument for 
fear of losing an effective tool.503 
Each of the lawyers interviewed on the topic of legal strategy gave a different answer 
over whether Equal Protection or Due Process arguments are stronger.  While this has not 
seemed to create dissention and disunity within and among the organizations litigating marriage 
equality, it is impressive that after decades of litigation and many successes, attorneys are still 
unsure as to which argument is best.  The attorneys were also mostly in agreement that one must, 
as an attorney, represent the wishes of one’s client, but also stressed the organization’s goal of 
marriage equality had to be achieved through those clients.  Many of the attorneys solved this 
riddle by selecting clients with the same goals as the organization, while Wolfson argued the 
cause’s goals were paramount in any test case.  The consensus legal strategy of the attorneys 
therefore appears to be to select clients with identical goals as the organization representing 
them, and to employ every valid argument against anti-marriage equality law and constitutional 
amendments. 
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VII.  Conclusion 
 As was apparent throughout the interviews in this study, the environment surrounding the 
issue of marriage equality has changed dramatically over the past decade and even in the past 
year.  Windsor and the shift in public opinion in the United States to a majority of Americans 
supporting marriage equality have completely changed the circumstances the advocates for 
marriage equality face in the courtroom and out.  The coming years may bring even more 
dramatic changes, such as a decision from the United States Supreme Court mandating marriage 
equality in all states. 
This thesis found that the attorneys in major marriage equality organizations do not 
necessarily accept the entire backlash hypothesis, but do understand that the law and politics are 
inextricably linked with regard to marriage equality litigation campaigns.   Organizations 
litigating marriage equality cases understand that resistance to favorable court decisions is not 
only common but also able to be mitigated by robust public education and political advocacy.  
This demonstrates the internalization of the backlash hypothesis, even if some attorneys prefer to 
not use the term “backlash.”  However, the internalization of the backlash hypothesis is not 
complete by attorneys in the marriage equality litigation campaign.  In the event of a legal loss, 
the interviewed attorneys argued that national and regional organizations could spin the straw of 
legal defeat into political gold.  The litigation losses in Washington, New York, Maryland, and 
Oregon spurred many people to fight harder for the right to marry in the legislature, and also 
awakened non-LGB people to issues LGB people face with regard to marriage discrimination.  
The losses in Maine and California in the political sphere had a similar educational and 
radicalizing effect.  Further research is warranted to explore this interesting twist the marriage 
equality organizations put on the traditional backlash hypothesis.  With this nuance in the 
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organizations’ internalization of the backlash hypothesis, the organizations still accept the main 
provision of that hypothesis: negative repercussions will most likely occur after legal victories. 
The desire to mitigate negative repercussions to victories for marriage equality in court 
drives strategy of marriage equality advocacy organizations when it comes to selecting clients, 
marshalling amici curiae, and managing political campaigns that accompany litigation.  Clients 
are selected to appeal to as broad a spectrum of American society as possible, and to refute 
common prejudices about same-sex couples, such as the belief that they cannot raise children.  
Amici are also selected to rebut those arguments and to signal to the courts that vast swaths of 
society accept marriage equality.  These two processes involve legal institutions, but the 
arguments that the amici and plaintiffs make, both explicitly and implicitly, are political.  The 
amicus curiae brief of hundreds of businesses in Windsor did little to advance any legal 
arguments, but it sent a strong political message to the Supreme Court about how a vast swath of 
corporate America felt about marriage equality. 
The marriage equality organizations’ political campaigns now emphasize “earned media” 
– newspaper, radio and television reports – as well as town hall meetings and more grassroots 
interaction.  Civil unions, the backlash-mitigating compromise of the 2000s, are now no longer a 
valid option, and the attorneys in the organizations are unwilling to accept them.  The wide 
swings in public opinion toward favoring marriage equality have also led the organizations to 
struggle not only with resistance to legal victories, but also how to get those legal victories in the 
first place now that many people will not defend anti-marriage equality laws and constitutional 
amendments. 
These leading marriage equality advocacy attorneys acknowledge that the law and 
politics interact and intersect, but do not believe that the two influence each other.  The legal and 
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political arguments follow similar, if parallel tracks, with legal arguments emphasizing legal 
doctrines and political arguments emphasizing the dignity of marriage and the unfairness of 
marriage discrimination.  Despite the imagery of railroad tracks, as the statements about plaintiff 
selection and amicus curiae briefs show, political considerations drive decisions in legal aspects 
of lawsuits.  Attorneys deeply involved in marriage equality litigation also have no real 
consensus on whether Due Process or Equal Protection arguments are more effective.  The 
consensus instead appears to be to include all available valid arguments in briefs and oral 
arguments.  This is both a legal and political decision, since the two types of arguments have 
shown different levels of success when translated into political arguments.  Bonauto explained 
Due Process arguments are more “common sense,”504 but Esseks argued that the marriage 
equality advocates have had more success in court with Equal Protection arguments.  It makes 
good political sense to include all arguments so that as many people as possible may be swayed 
on an issue that, as Robinson explained, strikes different people in different ways.  Further 
research could also illuminate the political nature of lawsuit timing, to which Bonauto alluded to 
when talking about the anti-DOMA litigation campaign.  Even in decisions on entirely legal 
matters, political considerations factor in.  The politicization of the movement for marriage 
equality, even though it is focused on litigation, is the main strategy of the major organizations 
involved in that movement. 
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